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1 Introduction
In today’s economic environment multinational companies face more than ever
the urge for globalization (Meixell and Gargeya 2005, p. 532). Indeed, glo-
balization is a well-known phenomenon, since international trade already has
been existing for centuries. Silk, spices or porcelain have been traded between
Asia and Europe more than two thousand years ago. In fact, the speed of in-
ternational cross linking is new and especially the world’s economy development
(Jacob and Strube 2008, p. 2).
However, most of the corporation’s production networks are historically grown
and need to be adopted, renewed and enlarged, to further enable competition on
an international level. Sourcing and production decisions for industrial products
make up a large share of total costs; in the automotive industry, this proportion
amounts to around 60%. Thus, optimizing the global production footprint can
save up to 20% of total costs in the long term (Stolle, Na¨her, Frank, Reinecke,
Hexter and Dervisopoulos 2008, p. 325).
In order to achieve this, an integrated perspective on the value chain has to be ap-
plied. It is no longer sufficient to use conventional location planning techniques;
instead a holistic approach has to be pursued to cover a company’s entire produc-
tion and supply chain network. Within classical cost factors, regional value added
requirements (local content), duties, duty drawbacks and further trade barriers
should be integrated, to account for the globalized world (Meyer and Jacob 2008,
p. 141).
Based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the reduction
of tariffs began. Today a total of 283 regional trade agreements, among other
the Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul), are registered within the World Trade
Organization (WTO 2010a). However, some industries are still under special pro-
tection through non-tariff trade barriers and high customs duties. This special
protection applies amongst others for the Mercosul automotive industry. The
1
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Mercosul legal framework requires for a product specific value-based local con-
tent (Mercosul 1991, annex II), while a further Brazilian non-tariff barrier asks
for a minimum local value and weight added (BNDES 2006, Article 4). These dif-
ferences in calculation schemes assign additional complexity to the supply chain
design process.
Duty drawbacks are a refund on paid duties for goods designated for further ex-
portation and can be used to economize duty payments (Oh and Karimi 2006,
p. 595). The availability of duty drawback schemes and their incorporation in
the planning process leads to different supply chain configurations in order to
minimize total duty load.
It can be stated that global aspects have an incremental influence on the de-
sign process of supply chains and need therefore be considered when determining
optimal production networks.
1.1 Motivation and objectives
The following thesis deals with global production decisions under duties, duty
drawbacks and local content trade barriers with particular focus on Mercosul’s
automotive industry. It points out how these aspects interact and affect produc-
tion decisions in international supply chains of multinational companies.
To study the impact of global aspects on production decisions within Mercosul,
a mathematical model is formulated, which reflects the legal framework of the
Mercosul automotive industry. Due to its importance, the automotive sector
was excluded of the Mercosul creation process from the very beginning in 1991.
Politicians installed a technical Committee, which was instructed to harmonize
the automotive sector with regard to local content regulations and decomposition
of tariff barriers (IDB-INTAL 1997, pp. 30).
The developed model deals with the production network of a global acting truck
manufacturer. Local content as well as duty and duty drawback calculations
are modelled as constraints in a linear program. Existing mixed integer models
like Arntzen et al. (1995) or Oh and Karimi (2006) have already designed
production-distribution models considering duties and duty drawbacks in a gen-
eral manner. This work; in particular, extends the existing literature by provid-
ing a model able, to calculate the local content on a product specific level for
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a multi-product, multi-period environment. Further, detailed inward and out-
ward processing schemes are implemented to determine duty drawback claims
and necessary duty payments in detail, on basis of the specific product.
1.2 Structure
The introductory chapter presented the key elements of interests and gave a
methodological overview on the topic and its main aspects incorporated through
the developed mixed integer program. The remainder of the thesis is organized
as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical fundamentals of this thesis. It provides
a summary on external factors, influencing global production decisions. Different
forms of regional cooperation between countries and their motives are presented
and an overview on non-tariff trade barriers is given. Finally, common customs
regimes are introduced and a literature review is given.
Chapter 3 introduces the Mercosul trade area and its legal framework. It de-
scribes Mercosul’s history and its legislative organs. Furthermore, particular
Mercosul local content calculation methods with focus on the automotive indus-
try are presented as well as specific duty regulations for the territory.
In chapter 4 the mixed integer model is formulated. Two extensions to the
model are adopted. First, a specific Brazilian non-tariff trade barrier and second,
capacity planning decisions are included.
Chapter 5 develops numerical studies for the Mercosul automotive industry, to
highlight the interactions between the different global aspects on a truck manu-
facturer’s production network design and capacity planning decisions.
Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes the main results of this thesis. Further-
more, is given an outlook on future research topics of interest.
3
2 Theoretical Fundamentals
The following chapter provides a theoretical overview on challenges, which arise in
an international environment for corporations. Necessary terms and definitions
are given and particular aspects affecting global supply chain and production
networks are introduced. Finally, a literature review is given.
2.1 Supply chain definition
The focus of this thesis is on the supply chain of a multinational automotive
manufacturer. In a first step, it has to be clarified what exactly is meant by the
term and how it is used in the context of the following thesis. Coyle et al. (2008)
define a supply chain as:
”An extended enterprise that crosses the boundaries of individual firms
to span the related activities of all the companies involved in the total
supply chain. This extended enterprise should attempt to execute or
implement a coordinated, two-way flow of goods/services, information
and financials.”
(Coyle, Langley, Bardi, Gibson and Novack 2008, p. 20).
Although, this definition clearly incorporates various firms, when speaking of
supply chains, in this thesis the concept is used as a synonym for an intra-
organizational process.
Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997) refer to the term of supply chains as strategic
production-distribution models and distinguish between domestic and interna-
tional approaches (Vidal and Goetschalckx 1997, p. 2). To derive an optimal
design for the supply chain the authors suggest incorporating decisions on:
• Amount of locations and characteristic capacities
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• Sourcing
• Transportation methods
• Optimal flow of materials
• Inventories
However, Meixell and Gargeya (2005) point out that global supply chains, com-
pared to domestic networks, are more challenging to manage, due to additional
factors that need to be attended to; tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, duty
drawbacks, exchange rates, transfer prices, different cultures and political back-
grounds (Meixell and Gargeya 2005, p. 533).
Subsequently, the thesis gives a more detailed overview on trade factors influ-
encing international supply chains and how they are motivated. Regional coop-
eration and their categories are described, to obtain an understanding on legal
frameworks. This is followed by an introduction into tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers.
2.2 Regional cooperation
A regional cooperation describes the association of different countries in Preferen-
tial Trade Agreements (PTA) consolidated under the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Motives and specifications are various and presented subsequently.
2.2.1 Motivation for regional cooperation
Currently, 283 PTAs are registered within the WTO (WTO 2010a). This number
is expected to rise significantly within the following years, due to the increasing
competition of countries on the world market (Richard 2010, p. 227). The cur-
rent trend of a growing number of PTAs during the last two decades is known as
“new Regionalism”(Guerrieri and Dimon 2006). The authors cluster regionalism
into three waves. Beginning in the 1930s with the first wave, of highly protected
and discriminatory trade areas. As second wave they define the years between
1950 and 1970, where emerging countries focused on the progress of their national
industries, while discouraging imports. The current third wave differs, since lib-
eralization and deregulation are in the focus of PTAs (Guerrieri and Dimon 2006,
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pp. 86). Political governments use PTAs as an instrument to face globalization
challenges (Bouzas 2007, p. 334).
Moreover, an increasing number of North-South agreements is notable, which
is interesting, because of the national economical differences (Bouzas 2007, pp.
334). Free trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and Cameroon,
EU and Cote d’Ivoire or EU and South Africa are examples for this development
(WTO 2010b). The less developed country is granted a preferential access to
attractive large markets. As a consequence, exports increase and the economy
can be further developed. The counterpart is able to execute influence on pol-
icy towards improving investment conditions for international companies (Bouzas
2007, pp. 335).
But how are PTAs motivated? Beyond static welfare effects additional benefit
can be identified in larger markets. As static welfare effects are defined trade-
diverting; replacing an efficient supplier from the outside through a less efficient
from inside and trade-creation; generating trade through a more efficient member
(Bhagwati 1993, p. 33). What was not taken into consideration by this concept is
the deeper integration of today’s PTAs. Intellectual property rights, free transfer
of resources, investment and competition policies as well as environmental and
labor standards are often implemented, and generate welfare beyond the static
effect (Guerrieri and Dimon 2006, pp. 87).
Schirm (1999) identifies an additional motive for regionalism. Economies try
to improve their competitive situation on the world markets through coopera-
tion and liberalization. International corporations started decades ago building
up a worldwide production and distribution network and therefore became in-
dependent from one single country and its scope of action. A delimitation and
concentration on domestic politics is no longer the answer to global competition.
(Schirm 1999, pp. 20).
Nevertheless, problems arise through building PTAs all over the world. The par-
ticipation of one country in various PTAs and the applying of trade barriers lead
to a shift in the worldwide power-relations, not always to their best (Guerrieri and
Dimon 2006, pp. 91). The GATT, signed on 30th October 1947, was designed to
face these problems. Article I of the agreement demands for non-discrimination:
”Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
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country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other con-
tracting parties.”
(GATT 1947, article I).
This general most favored nation treatment has one exception. Article XXIV
GATT permits customs unions and free trade agreements among WTO members
as long as they guarantee themselves a 100% preference. This clear rule is com-
patible with non-discrimination and multinationalism, the long term goal of the
WTO. However, most agreements do not fulfill this strong constraint, but even
though they are accepted by the WTO. Lawyers and government representatives
succeeded to wash out the article, resulting in its today’s practice (Bhagwati
1993, pp. 25).
2.2.2 Types of preferential trade agreements
There can be identified five international integration categories, listed by increas-
ing degree of cooperation and therefore, loss of national sovereignty:
• Preferential trade agreement, represents the weakest form of integra-
tion. The signing members allow each other to import and export several
goods at a preferred tariff rate, compared to third party countries (Krueger
1997, p. 173).
• Free trade agreements (FTA), are the next higher form of integration.
Internal tariff rates are set to zero, whereas, external tariffs still differ in
the member countries. This leads to the hazard of trade deflection. Goods
are imported through the country with the most favorable import tariffs
and passed on to the country of destination. A problem adjustable by
implementing rules of origin (Mesa 2009, pp. 9).
• Customs unions, establish a common external tariff and have a zero tariff
for internal trade. Rules of origin, to prevent trade deflections are therefore
not necessary. National governments lose sovereignty through the higher
form of integration and increased need of coordination (Mesa 2009, pp.
10).
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• Common market, is the next step of integration. Services and production
factors, such as capital and human resources are allowed to move freely.
National governments have to shift power to a supranational organization,
in order to harmonize economical politics and the legal framework for the
market. (Mesa 2009, pp. 11)
• Single market, is the highest form of integration. Physical, technical and
economical barriers are completely harmonized. This form is also known as
economic and monetary union (Krueger 1997, p. 174).
2.3 Non-tariff trade barriers
Despite, strong liberalization on worldwide trade concerning the diminishment
of tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers were installed to compensate the loss of pro-
tection. Under non-tariff trade barriers can be summarized all interferences on
trade, except for tariffs. Three different types of non-tariff trade barriers can be
distinguished. First, import quota, only a limited amount of a certain product
category may be imported per period. Second, product standards, e.g. technical
or environmental requirements are used to seal against exports from developing
countries and finally rules of origin (ROO). They determine the origin of a good,
hence, derives a preferential or non-preferential treatment (Petersen 2004, pp.
2).
Non-tariff trade barriers create trade diversion, i.e. imports from outside the
trade area are replaced by imports from member countries, to comply with the
barriers. Consequently, this limits a company’s flexibility and additional costs
have to be accepted. Local, less experienced or more expensive suppliers need to
be chosen, know-how has to be shared and additional costs, through screening
potential partners arise (Krueger 1997, pp. 174). Since, global competition is
intense, there is no choice for management, besides, accepting these restrictions
and hazards, in order to act successful on an international basis.
In the following, it is taken a closer look on rules of origin. The creation of
trade blocks introduced the need for an instrument, capable to determine the
originating status of a good (Li, Lim and Rodrigues 2007, p. 425). In a FTA
member states stick to their different external tariff schemes, while reducing in-
ternal barriers. ROO, are an instrument to inhibit trade deflection, i.e. goods
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enter through the member state of the FTA, with the lowest import tariffs and
are afterwards shipped forward to their actual destination (Krueger 1997, pp.
178). ROO prevent this action, as they demand an originating status, in order
to benefit from the preferential treatment inside the FTA.
Li et al. (2006) distinguish three types of ROO, to designate the originating
status:
• Change in tariff classification, refers to the harmonized system (HS)
of the WTO, which assigns to every good a characteristic position in this
framework. Change in tariff classification requires that imported goods
are refined to a final product, classified under a higher position in the HS
(Vermulst 1994, pp. 449).
• Process rule or technical test, gives a positive or negative list for pro-
cessing a good to achieve originating status (Vermulst 1994, p. 450).
• Value added or percentage criterion, may occur in three forms. The
first method is limiting imported parts through a maximum proportion of
total parts. The second form works vice versa and requires a minimum
domestic aliquot. Finally, the value-of-parts test evaluates, if originating
inputs account for a minimum percentage of total value (Vermulst 1994, p.
436). These methods are known as local content (LC) requirements.
LC usually is defined in terms of volume or value, referring to cost structures.
Physical content protection schemes require for a quantitative fraction of parts
to be originating, while value based content schemes request for the fulfillment
of a certain percentage of value, to count as originating (Munson and Rosenblatt
1997, p. 278). Change in Tariff Classification and Process Rules are easier to
implement, whereas the value added criterion is more complicated to define (Li,
Lim and Rodrigues 2007, p. 425).
Peterson (2004) describes the LC as:
LC =
local value added
total value of the good
·% (2.1)
LC returns the percentage of an originating proportion of a good and has in most
cases to fulfill a minimum requirement. Nevertheless, evaluating the exact cost
structures of parts included into a product is difficult, considering the allocation
of variable and fixed costs to the particular components (Vermulst 1994, p. 437).
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The LC requirement is a powerful instrument for governments to develop foreign
investments and increase industry know-how (Petersen 2004, pp. 9).
2.4 Duties and customs regimes
This section deals with duties and associated customs regimes. In a global-
ized world economy duties and customs regimes have an incremental impact
on global supply chains. Companies carry out a significant effort to save duty
payments when designing production networks. For example, through shipping
semi-knocked down (SKD) or completely-knocked down (CKD) kits of automo-
tive products and an afterwards on-site assembly. Thus, import duties can be
economized (Kohler 2008, p. 56). Nevertheless, available customs regimes as duty
drawbacks are often not actively managed when designing supply chain networks
(Oh and Karimi 2006, p. 597). Even though, national customs laws are under
steady change an active management can reveal significant financial advantages
(Grainger 2000, p. 43).
2.4.1 Duties
Duties are a classical instrument of foreign trade policy, reflecting import taxes
(Mah 2007, p. 967). Nowadays, duties have more a protective function, which
can no longer be compared to the initial purpose of tariffs, the simple increase
of public revenues. The WTO further acknowledges e.g. “educational tariffs”
to protect certain industries or “anti-dumping tariffs” to seal against subsidized
products or dumping prices from third party countries (Mesa 2009, pp. 6). Tariffs
on imported commodities may not hinder that foreign products enter the country,
but they install a barrier, protecting domestic goods by increasing market prices
for third party products. Potential price disadvantages of local products are
balanced (Mesa 2009, pp. 4).
It can be stated that developing countries have considerable higher import tariffs
to protect their industries and increase revenues, compared to already developed
countries (Mah 2007, p. 968). In general, tariffs range between 0% and 15% on
top of the customs value of a good, so called ad valorem duties. In extreme cases
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tariff rates up to 30% and higher are possible, as they can be found for example
for automotive goods imported into Mercosul territory. (Hu¨bner 2007, p. 83).
The customs value of a good is defined for WTO members under Article VII
GATT (GATT 1947). According to this article the customs value of an imported
commodity is calculated on a cost plus insurance and freight (CIF) basis. It has
to be noted that the applicable tariff rate is not equal for all trade partners and
may also depend on the country of origin and if, any preferential trade agreements
are valid (Hu¨bner 2007, p. 83).
Figure 2.1: CIF and FOB value illustration (Bernstorff 2010, pp. 129)
Figure 2.1 presents the definitions of CIF and FOB values of a good, according to
International Commercial Terms (Incoterms). These concepts were introduced
by the International Chamber of Commerce and are frequently used in worldwide
trade contracting as well as for LC determinations.
The CIF-value includes the costs of a product plus additional expenses for freight
and an insurance fee over at least 110% of the underlying asset’s value until the
port of destination, covered by the exporter. On the opposite, the transfer of
perils from the exporter to the importer is already realized at the port of origin
(Bernstorff 2010, pp. 144). The FOB-value on the contrary, contains the costs
for the product itself, plus transport to the port of destination. For the remaining
transport the importer is held responsible. However, the transfer of peril is similar
to the CIF-value concept (Bernstorff 2010, pp. 129).
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2.4.2 Customs regimes
Tariff payments for international trade flows are operated through customs regimes
(Kohler 2008, p. 49). Particular customs regimes of a country are various and de-
pend on national law or stipulations in PTA’s. Grainger (2000) outlines common
regimes in use; import into free circulation, it is applied, if the imported good’s
destination is inside the customs territory. The imported factor is subject to
the tariff payment and thereafter moves freely inside the area. Another available
customs regime is the customs warehousing, it is used, if the final destination of
the good is not yet known at the moment of importation. No duties have to be
paid until the good is registered for a different customs regime. Temporary im-
portation is a further common customs regime. It liberates from duty payments,
if the commodity is re-exported in the same state as imported after a certain
time interval (Grainger 2000, p. 42).
Customs regimes with a greater importance for designing supply chain networks
are the inward processing relief and outward processing relief. Through an appro-
priate supply chain network configuration these schemes can be used to diminish
the overall duty load throughout the production network.
The inward processing relief, is also known as suspension or drawback. Input
factors from outside the customs territory are imported, in order to refine them
inside the territory into a good designated for export. Two methods are possible
for handling the import duties concerning a drawback. Imported input factors
are suspended from being charged with tariffs or on the contrary, already paid
tariffs are rebated (Kohler 2008, p. 50). Figure 2.2 illustrates this process, a
shortblock from the European Union (EU) is imported by Brazil, in order to be
part of an inward processing for a truck engine in Brazil, designated for the EU
sales market. The importation of the shortblock is applicable under the inward
processing relief and Mercosul import duties on the EU shortblock may be sus-
pended or rebated.
The outward processing relief on the opposite, describes the same procedure
discussed under inward processing. However, the point of view is different. In-
put factors are refined outside the alliance territory and afterwards re-imported.
Therefore, import duties have to be paid on the ad valorem of a product, i.e. the
value added outside the customs territory (Kohler 2008, pp. 49). It is the same
process, as illustrated under figure 2.2, however, considered from the European’s
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Figure 2.2: Inward and outward processing
angle. The EU shortblock is processed in Brazil, outside the EU customs ter-
ritory. Hence, at the re-importation of the truck engine, incorporating the EU
shortblock, duties have to be paid on the ad valorem. Thus, the engine assembly
process in Brazil and the engine parts from the Mercosul territory are liable to
EU import duties.
It can be summarized that a single production process can be seen as inward and
outward processing, depending on the point of view. Duty drawbacks on paid
import duties only can be claimed under the inward processing scheme from the
nation occupying the active part at the processing.
Duty Drawback schemes in all existing kinds have one primary goal: promoting
exports (Chao, YU and YU 2006, p. 432). These redemptions are especially
interesting in countries with high import tariffs, where else wise producing for
export, with imported input factors would be non-competitive with world market
prices (Panagariya 1992, pp. 131). Companies gain duty free access to resources
and can develop their export business, which should enhance welfare of the ex-
porting economy.
In Brazil, for instance, the automotive industry is highly protected by import
tariffs. The government motivates manufacturer to claim duty drawbacks on
imported inputs, in order to develop their export business (Panagariya 1992, p.
132)
WTO members are allowed to offer these forms of redemption as export support-
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ing instrument, inside the limits of a defined legal framework. Article VI GATT
(GATT 1947) limits duty drawbacks to an upper bound, namely the tariffs levied
for import (Mah 2007, p. 968). Even though, duty drawbacks bear a high cost
savings potential for a worldwide manufacturing company, Oh and Karimi (2006)
state that duty drawbacks are often not claimed or taken into account, while de-
signing the supply chain network. In the United States every year about 1,5 - 10
billion $ US of possible duty drawbacks stay unvalued (Oh and Karimi 2006, pp.
595). Hence, the customs regimes inward and outward processing are included
in the following model formulation as key elements, to examine their impact on
supply chain network design.
2.5 Literature review
The following literature review provides an overview on research works linked to
the context of this thesis. However, especially relevant works incorporating ca-
pacity planning and global aspects as local content restrictions, duties and duty
drawbacks are reviewed. A more detailed list on global supply chain models is
given by Melo, Nickel and Saldanha-da-Gama (2009), Meixell and Gargey (2005)
or Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997).
At first the literature review presents research works focusing on LC requirements
under PTAs, duties and capacity planning problems. This is followed by a review
on relevant papers concerning duty drawbacks, the special focus of interest.
Munson and Rosenblatt (1997)
Munson and Rosenblatt (1997) examine the effect of LC rules on global sourcing
decisions. In a first step a single plant model is formulated under the assumption
that LC restrictions have to be met, otherwise, penalties are sufficiently high.
The objective function minimizes sourcing costs over all possible local or global
suppliers. This deterministic single plant model is extended in a second step to a
multi-plant model. Munson and Rosenblatt (1997) cover additionally the impact
of different LC quota in local industries on a macroeconomic level.
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Bhutta et al. (2003)
The developed model by Bhutta et al. (2003) attends to production, distribution
and investment decisions of a global acting corporation. The formulated mixed
integer program addresses the problem, where plants should be opened and how
their configuration in terms of chosen capacity volumes should look like to max-
imize profit. The formulated model considers necessary investments, capacity
adjustment costs and inventory decisions. Further, global aspects as tariff and
exchange rates are included. However, the exchange rate is assumed as a linear
function and reflects therefore a strong simplification. LC decision are not taken
into account.
Chakravarty (2005)
Chakravarty (2005) provides a model for optimizing plant investment decisions,
while simultaneously determining the necessary selling prices for the products at
its designated markets. The model assumes that manufacturers are not price tak-
ers and therefore this aspect needs to be attended to, while optimizing investment
decisions. Hence, demand is modelled as a price sensitive function, depending
on the manufacturers cost. In order to determine the most beneficial plant con-
figurations the occurring investments are allocated as overheads to the variable
production costs of a product at each plant, whereof the particular selling price
is derived from. Further, global aspects as taxes, LC, tariffs, exchange rates and
market sizes are taken into account, while maximizing the after tax profit of a
manufacturer.
Wilhelm et al. (2005)
Wilhelm et al. (2005) develop for the free trade area NAFTA a strategic model
for designing the production network of a manufacturer. The authors intend to
develop a decision support model with practical relevance for managers and con-
clude therefore with an exemplary application. However, the model maximizes
after tax profits, while taking taxes, transfer prices and LC requirements from
the NAFTA region as global aspects into consideration. The LC constraint is
modelled as a hard constraint limiting the non-originating value of every good to
a upper limit. The LC is always fulfilled. Their model works under the premise
of a deterministic business environment.
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Li, Lim and Rodrigues (2007)
Li, Lim and Rodrigues (2007) examine sourcing decisions for multinational corpo-
rations, especially concerning the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agree-
ment. This agreement forms a free trade area between Japan and Singapore.
Rules of origin were implemented to prevent transshipment. Their developed
optimization model considers LC decisions and duties as global aspects. Firstly,
described as non-linear integer program, it is consequently remodelled into a
linear integer program for easier solving. The LC restriction is defined as soft
constraint, i.e. a fulfillment of LC for inner area trade is not required. If the
minimum LC on the contrary is met, duty payments are eliminated.
Guo et al. (2008)
Guo et al. (2008) model a multi-stage facility location problem under free trade
agreements. They implement LC decisions through cumulating the particular
value added over all stages of a specific country and contrast it to the related LC
requirement. As further global aspect duties are incorporated. In order to solve
their problem the authors develop a multi-exchange heuristic, based on the very
large-scale neighborhood search and investigate it with an experimental analysis.
Stephan (2008)
Stephan (2008) develops a strategic network design model under the influence
of LC requirements in Free trade agreements, especially considering the automo-
tive industry. The author therefore, presents a non-linear planning model for the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and its specific automotive require-
ments. LC fulfillment is modelled as soft constraint and costs are determined
accurately to the NAFTA legal framework. The objective function minimizes
total costs.
Bihlmaier, Koberstein and Obst (2009)
Bihlmaier, Koberstein and Obst (2009) present a two-stage, stochastic mixed inte-
ger model for capacity planning and analyzing strategic flexibilities for uncertain
demands in the automotive industry. Further, a detailed work force planning
via shift models is included. Global aspects are not taken into account, while
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minimizing total costs. In order to solve this stochastic formulation the authors
develop an accelerated decomposition approach based on Benders decomposition.
They conclude their work with a performance study, followed by a numerical case
study.
The following research papers deal with facility location problems and account in
addition for possible duty payments and the opportunity of duty drawbacks,
while optimizing the supply chain:
Arntzen et al. (1995)
Arntzen et al. (1995) developed a global supply chain model (GSCM) for the
Digital Equipment Corporation, considering their production and distribution
network. Therefore, they created a large deterministic mixed integer program
with a split objective function. It is a composition of minimizing costs, as well
as time. Operative attributes taken into account are variable and fixed costs as
well as capacity and demand fulfillment constraints. Time however, is considered
in the objective function by a weighted factor of cumulative production and dis-
tribution times.
In order to fulfill the claim of a global supply chain model, Arntzen et al. further
include LC, tax, duty payment and duty drawback decisions. The LC constraint
is modelled as a so called hard constraint, i.e. LC must be fulfilled. Hence, no
decision is possible, on whether fulfilling LC or paying the related penalty duties.
Duty drawbacks are granted for products and components imported to a produc-
tion site, designated for further exportation.
Oh and Karimi (2006)
Oh and Karimi (2006) develop an international production-distribution model for
the chemical industry. Their focus of interest is on duties and duty drawbacks.
The authors state that duty drawbacks have an incremental influence on inter-
national supply chains. However, drawbacks are not taken into account to this
extend in existing production-distribution models.
The implemented objective function maximizes total after tax profit, accounting
for variable and fixed production costs. Duty drawback regulations are modelled
in detail. Thereto, the bill of material for a chemical product is used to trace
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back imported input factors. The sum of all paid import duties returns an upper
bound for drawback claims. To obtain the amount of claims, the model calcu-
lates the export quota of a final product and multiplies it with the predetermined
upper bound for drawbacks.
All these calculations are executed in a multi- supplier, multiperiod environment,
which complicates the problem, concerning inventory tracking and different im-
port tariff payments.
The authors test their model for the chemical industry and conclude that im-
port and export profiles change, whether or not, duty drawback constraints are
respected. The allowance of duty drawbacks results in production-distribution
networks with higher after tax profits.
Villegas and Quenniche (2008)
Villegas and Quenniche (2008) develop a general multinational supply chain
model. They claim for their work to include previous research factors, like trans-
port cost and duty drawbacks, in a more generalized and comprehensive manner
than existing literature.
Their model maximizes earnings, whilst, calculating the optimal transfer prices
between interdivisional profit center. In order to reproduce a realistic environ-
ment, the model includes production and transportation costs, import tariffs,
exchange rate risks and corporate taxes. Duty drawbacks can be claimed for
products imported, previously treated by the importing division (outward pro-
cessing) or products for export previously processed abroad (inward processing).
Villegas and Quenniche concentrate on the relations inside a company and ex-
clude supplier selection as well as LC restrictions. Their model never was tested.
Kohler (2008)
Kohler (2008) develops a deterministic mixed integer program for supply chain
design. He focuses on the modelling of material flows between different pro-
duction sites and derives thereof information on global aspects influencing the
supply chain design. Global aspects taken into account are taxes, duties, duty
drawbacks, LC-requirements and exchange rates. The objective function max-
imizes profits and is further extended into a multi-objective function through
additionally considering delivery times. Due to the holistic approach the author
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has to cope with various premises, therefore, legal frameworks cannot be incor-
porated accurately.
Table 2.3 provides an concluding overview on the presented literature respec-
tively the most important attributes. Incorporated characteristics with regard to
global aspects and capacity planning are summarized.
Figure 2.3: Literature overview
Although, the examination of the non-tariff trade barrier LC is purpose to a var-
ious number of research papers its implementation in mathematical modelling is
very general and often not applicable for an operative application. LC calculation
schemes are as various as the number of PTAs in force and report often differ-
ent specification for industries of special interest, e.g. the Brazilian automotive
sector. The same difficulties can be stated for duty and duty drawback calcu-
lations. Research works incorporating duty drawbacks are not very widespread
and consider drawbacks in a very generalized way. Therefore, in order to prop-
erly examine the interactions of LC requirements, duties and duty drawbacks a
mathematical model has to be formulated in such a way that represents actual
effective legal frameworks for the PTA and the industrial sector of interest.
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This gap is closed by this thesis. It is presented a mixed integer program to opti-
mize the production network of a truck manufacturer acting on Mercosul territory.
The model incorporates effective legal frameworks for Mercosul automotive LC
calculations, duty regulations and applicable customs regimes. Therefore, valid
disclosures on their interactions can be concluded, whereby, the production net-
work and capacity decisions of the manufacturer are optimized.
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After having introduced global trade barriers as well as duties and duty draw-
backs from a methodological point of view, this chapter focuses on the legal
framework of the Mercosul territory. The following section deals with a brief in-
troduction into the trade area Mercosul, its history of origins and decision making
institutions. Furthermore, the legal framework with regard to global production
network design is presented in detail. In particular, Mercosul LC requirements,
duties and Mercosul customs regimes are provided respectively to the automotive
industry. Finally, a characteristic Brazilian non-tariff trade barrier is introduced
with special focus on the automotive sector.
3.1 History and organization
The regional integration process in South America was already in progress before
the establishment of Mercosul. In the following, a brief overview on the history
is provided. In addition, the organization and legislation process of the Mercosul
territory is described.
3.1.1 Integration projects in South America
Asociacio´n Lationamericana de Libre Comercio (ALAC)
The ALAC was founded in 1960 in Montevideo and was the first South American
attempt for a regional integration project. The eleven member states Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Columbia, Ecuador, Venezuela
and Bolivia declared the establishment of a free trade area within twelve years
as their common goal. Their long term ambition was the creation of a common
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market. Supranational institutions with decision making rights were not estab-
lished, instead, consulting and support giving organizations were installed. As
the negotiation process stumbled, their goals never were realized. During the
1970s the contract was formally still in force, but agreed meetings never were
held (Wehner 1999, pp. 30).
Asociacio´n Lationamericana de Integracio´n (ALADI)
In 1980 the ALADI was founded by the same eleven member states allied under
the ALAC and is therefore its direct successor organization. Long term objective
is again the creation of a common market. Since, the member states learned from
their previous mistakes, this goal was declared without a determined deadline.
The ALADI allows member states to sign with each other bilateral preferential
trade agreements, free trade agreements and customs unions. These contracts
have to be registered with the ALADI and are called “acuerdos de Alcance re-
gional”. Thus, the ALADI can be seen as a framework for an integration process
within the South American continent (Wehner 1999, pp. 31).
Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul)
Figure 3.1: Mercosul member countries
Acuerdo de Alcance Parcial de Complementac¸a˜o Econoˆmica No. 18 (ACE) is the
“Tratado de Asunc´ıon (TA)”, the foundation contract of the Mercado Comu´m del
Sur (Mercosur), in Spanish or in Portuguese, Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul).
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The TA was signed on March 26th 1991 from the founding countries illustrated
under figure 3.1, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with following objec-
tives:
• Free transit of goods, services and production factors
• Establishment of a common external tariff
• Establishment of a common trade policy
• Macroeconomic coordination of politics
Their intention was to realize these goals within a transition period of three years,
until the 31st of December 1994. Their expectation was to increase economic
growth, efficiency and competitive ability for the region, along with, granting an
increased social justice (Basedof and Ju¨rgen 2000, pp. 19).
Mercosul is after the US, the European Union and Japan the fourth biggest
economy, accounting for 70% of the South American area with about 240 million
inhabitants (Funders 2007, pp. 18). The European Union represents the biggest
importer to Mercosul and is therefore one of its most important trade partners.
Mercosul and the European Union signed the “Interregional Framework Coopera-
tion Agreement” in 1995 with the long term intention of creating an interregional
association (Funders 2007, pp. 18).
In the following years, the TA was widely revised and completed by protocols.
The member countries stated later that the contract has to be understood as
basic agreement for the initialization of the integration process. At the beginning
two institutions, the “Conselho de Mercado comum (CMC)” and the “Grupo de
Mercado comum (GMC)”, were meant to be installed. However, this framework
was later extended by the “Protocol de Ouro Preto”, establishing further institu-
tions and a more relaxed time framework to realize the Mercosul goals (Rocha de
Mello Martins 2001, pp. 23).
3.1.2 Decision-making institutions
The TA and its amendment protocols are considered as primary law on which
the Mercosul was founded. Thus, secondary law are all legal acts legislated by
the Mercosul institutions (Wehner 1999, pp. 77). These regulations are passed
continuously. Due to their enumeration it is defined, which institution legislated
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them at which date. For example, CMC/DEC 10/94, is the 10th decision of the
CMC in 1994. As a result, the legal framework of the Mercosul is in a steady
dynamic extension, to realize the goals defined by the TA.
Mesa (2009) gives an overview on the most important institutions and their
composition:
• Conselho de Mercado Comum (CMC), is the superior council of Mer-
cosul and consists of the External Relations and Economics Ministers from
all member states. Its presidency changes every sixth month. The CMC
decrees “decisa˜os (CMC/DEC)”, which aim at the fulfillment of the TA
goals. All CMC/DEC are agreed on concordant and binding for all mem-
bers (Mesa 2009, pp. 46).
• Grupo Mercado Comum (GMC), is the executive institution. Its task
is the realization of the CMC/DEC. The GMC consists of 32 members. Ev-
ery member state is allowed to appoint four permanent as well as four chang-
ing representatives. The GMC legislates so called “resoluc¸o˜es (GMC/RES)”
that are binding for all members. In addition, eleven sub-working groups for
particular industries, like the sub group automotive, were installed (Mesa
2009, pp. 49).
• Comissa˜o de Comercio do Mercosul (CCM), was introduced by the
“Protocol de Ouro Preto”. Its task is to support the GMC concerning
economical questions. Members are four permanent as well as four changing
representatives from each country, meeting at least once per month. They
legislate binding “Directivas” or suppose non-binding “Propuestas” (Mesa
2009, pp. 51).
• Parlamento do Mercosul, the 90 delegates elected by their home parlia-
ments have no decision making competencies so far. They consult installed
institutions and represent their home parliaments. However, this should
change as well as the fact that in the future delegates are elected directly
(Mesa 2009, pp. 55).
• Tribunal Permanenete de Revision, this court of justice is responsi-
ble for litigations in correlation with the Mercosul legal framework. Its
permanent residence is stationed in Asuncio´n, Paraguay (Mesa 2009, pp.
54).
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3.1.3 Classification of Mercosul
The overall goal of the TA was the creation of a common market. This was meant
to be achieved in less than five years until the end of 1994. A very ambitious
intention that could not yet be realized. Nevertheless, some significant processes
were made towards it. Internal free trade and a common external tariff for im-
ports are realized at a great deal, besides some still existing exclusion. Their
abolishment is one of the most important projects on the current agenda (Mer-
cosul/CMC 2010a).
The Mercosul agreement can be ranked between a FTA and a customs union.
The main difference between both is that a customs union applies a common
external tariff, which makes LC rules to avoid trade deflections unnecessary.
The Mercosul legal framework recently focuses very strong on building up a com-
mon external tariff and disposing the last exceptions to it. However, LC regula-
tions are still applied and a double levying of duty payments is possible, while
crossing a border inside the Mercosul. Concluding can be said that the Mercosul
integration process is beyond the classification of a Free Trade Agreement and can
be seen as an incomplete customs union or a customs union under development.
3.2 Mercosul tariff regulations
Under this section the implementation process for the two major goals from the
TA is presented. Free transit of goods inside the Mercosul territory and estab-
lishing a common external tariff opposite third party countries. The following
section includes the intentions stated in the TA and contrasts them to the actual
effective application.
3.2.1 Intra-Mercosul trade
Article 1 of the TA defines that until December 31st 1994 all intra-Mercosul tar-
iff payments should be abolished to achieve free trade for goods inside Mercosul
(Mercosul 1991, Article 1). Annex one of the TA gives a detailed scheme for
the incremental cutback on inner trade area tariffs until the end of 1994. For
Paraguay and Uruguay an extension of one year to this deadline was designated.
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Nevertheless, every country was allowed to introduce exceptions to this preferen-
tial treatment. These exclusion lists were meant to be reduced by 20% each year
(Mercosul 1991, Article 7, Anexo I). By the end of 1994 all exceptions should
have vanished. Brazil was allowed to except 324 items, Argentina 394, Paraguay
439 and Uruguay 960 (Mercosul 1991, Article 6, Anexo I). Most of them could
be found in the textile, steel or agricultural sector, which are protected industries
and therefore have special needs for the liberalization process (IDB-INTAL 1996,
p. l8).
Later CMC/DEC 5/94 and CMC/DEC 24/94 allowed exceptions to the free trade
for products of sensible industries beyond the original deadline. CMC/DEC 29/94
installs another arrangement, going beyond simple excluding. It demands for the
Mercosul automotive industry the installation of a special committee, dealing
with the liberalization of the intra-Mercosul automotive market as well as the
handling of a common external tariff (Mercosul/CMC 1994e).
The automotive as well as the sugar sector are industries of special interest with
a strong lobby in Mercosul countries. Through their influence on national gov-
ernments, lobbyists try to impair decisions towards their advantage, ending up
in higher protection of national interests (Malcher 2004, p. 129).
A complete free trade within the Mercosul territory has not been established. De-
spite its original intention, there is still the need for rules of origin to determine
the derivation of a good. These rules of origin, applying on Mercosul territory
are explained under section 3.3.
3.2.2 Common external tariff
A common external tariff (CET) was designated from the very beginning. Article
1 of the TA refers to a “tarifa externa comum” opposite all third party countries
outside Mercosul. In order to build up free trade for goods, a CET possesses an
essential role to achieve it. The CET assures that imported goods, after paying
the Mercosul import duty can freely move inside Mercosul (Funders 2007, pp.
229), representing the customs regime “import into free circulation” (Grainger
2000, p. 42).
For the CET the TA contains less detailed proceeding instructions. It is men-
tioned that until the end of December 1994, when the Mercosul officially should
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start, a CET should be agreed on. CMC/DEC 22/94 introduces therefore, a
Harmonized Nomenclature System for all goods. It resembles to the Harmonized
System of the WTO and contains for about 85% of all Mercosul goods a com-
mon tariff. Article three of the CMC/DEC 22/94 allows the member countries
to exclude certain goods from the CET, accordingly, to the exceptions available
for inner Mercosul trade. However, for the automotive industry the responsible
committee also deals with the regulation of an automotive CET. Until today,
there are still items excluded from the CET. These items have to be documented
on lists for every country. CMC/DEC 28/09 is the most recent decision dealing
with the exceptions. It schedules that until the end of 2011 all of the up to 100
exceptions still assigned to every country, should be abolished (Mercosul/CMC
2009c). It has to be mentioned that these deadlines were continuously postponed
over the last years and therefore, the expire dates have to be referred to very
carefully (IDB-INTAL 2009, p. 79).
Figure 3.2: Common external tariff (CET)
Another problem yet unsolved is the double levying of tariffs. Since, the Merco-
sul intends to set up a customs union this phenomenon is unusual. It is justified
by the member states through the exclusion lists and the lack of a distribu-
tion mechanisms on tariff revenues (IDB-INTAL 2009, p. 75). For example, a
commodity (non-compliant with Mercosul LC) entering the Mercosul customs
territory through Brazil with destination Argentina has to pay the CET twice,
on the Brazilian as well as the Argentinean border. Figure 3.2 illustrates this
situation. Every time a good not compliant with Mercosul LC crosses a border
the CET has to be paid. CMC/DEC 54/04 explicitly addresses this problem and
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defines following guidelines to further develop the customs area:
• Imported goods, after paying the CET, are seen as originating in the Mer-
cosul territory
• Legislation of a common customs code
• Online system for the customs administration
• Distribution mechanism for the customs revenue
Most of the topics are still on Mercosul’s agenda, whereas CMC/DEC 27/10
legislated finally, the “Co´digo aduaneiro do Mercosul” (CAM) - the common
Mercosul customs code. In addition, CMC/DEC 10/10 provides a timetable
divided into three stages with the final deadline in January 2019 for achieving
the presented aims of CMC/DEC 54/04. Article 158 CAM defines the modalities
of possible duty payments in the Mercosul territory:
• Ad Valorem duties are expressed in a percentage and calculated on the
basis of the customs value of a good. The CET is an Ad Valorem duty.
• Special tariffs are fixed values and charged per imported unit.
• Mixture of both duty types
Article 163 CAM specifies the Mercosul custom’s value. It refers explicitly to
the article VII GATT, where the WTO defines its draft of the customs value,
the CIF value of a good (GATT 1947, article VII). Article 164 CAM, declares
the properties of the Mercosul customs value. It includes costs for producing the
good plus costs for transport and an insurance fee until it reaches the customs
territory of destination (Mercosul 2010, article 163,164). This definition equals
the CIF value, according to the Incoterms as well as the the WTO customs value
definition.
3.2.3 Mercosul customs regimes
Beneath, the customs regime “import into free circulation” through paying the
CET on the customs value, the CAM describes amongst others the possibility for
inward as well as outward processing of input factors:
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• Article 56 CAM refers to inward processing, if a good is imported and
refined for further export purpose inside Mercosul, it can be liberated from
customs duties and duty drawbacks can be claimed.
• Article 86 CAM refers to outward processing, goods temporary exported
and refined outside the Mercosul territory only have to pay duties on the
value added outside Mercosul.
Free trade areas and customs unions normally ban the possibility of duty draw-
backs on trade flows between member states, as the North American Free trade
agreement did. In general, duty drawback schemes may exclusively be available
for imports on goods, consequently exported to third party countries from outside
the trade area, in order to prevent bypassing the originating criteria established
within the preferential trade area (Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga 2003, pp. 1).
The abolishment of intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks was meant to be realized for
the Mercosul territory as well. Article 12 of the CMC/DEC 10/94 stipulates that
intra-regional trade should not benefit from duty drawbacks. CMC/DEC 31/00
introduces for the first time a concrete deadline considering the abolishment of
intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks: the 31st of December 2000. Furthermore, the
decision asks the GMC to provide an overview on all additionally applied na-
tional non-tariff trade barriers and suggest therefore harmonization possibilities
until January 1st 2006. These deadlines were postponed constantly, compare
CMC/DEC 69/00, CMC/DEC 32/03, CMC/DEC 33/05, CMC/DEC 02/06 and
CMC/DEC 57/08. A common regulation is not yet agreed on.
Intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks are still possible, due to CMC/DEC 20/09 until
December 31st 2016. This decision indicates that in terms of legal certainty, a
binding framework has to be found. Simple postponement is no longer an appro-
priate solution (Mercosul/CMC 2009b).
Duty drawback regulations are national law and administrated in Brazil by Por-
teria SECEX no. 10 and Decreto no. 6.759, distinguishing two general types of
drawbacks:
1. Drawback Suspensa˜o: in this case duty payments are suspended, while
importing input factors for inward processing.
2. Drawback Isenc¸a˜o: imported goods, meant for further export, are liber-
ated from duty payments.
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These two laws explicitly allude on their export developing purpose, a domestic
excess supply should be avoided by all means. The overall goal is to strengthen
the national export industry and enable companies to compete with world mar-
ket prices. Possible drawbacks have to be claimed within a specified period of
time. Article 62 SECEX refers to the processes available for duty drawbacks.
Input factors need to be transformed, improved, assembled or refurbished in or-
der to acquire duty drawbacks through the customs regime of inward processing
in Brazil.
3.3 Mercosul non-tariff trade barriers
As presented before, neither a complete intra-Mercosul free trade is in place, nor
is the CET fully harmonized. Rules of origin are necessary to cope with these
conditions. In the following section these non-tariff trade barriers are introduced.
First, the general rule of origin for the Mercosul territory is presented followed by
its equivalent for the automotive industry. Finally, information on a special non-
tariff trade barrier are provided, which is from special interest at the Brazilian
market.
3.3.1 General rules of origin in Mercosul
Rules of origin are used in the Mercosul territory to avoid trade deflections. Since,
the Mercosul member states have not yet established a CET for all goods, there
is the need for rules to define, if a product or good is originating from Mercosul
and receives therefore a preferential treatment. These rules are summarized for
the Mercosul territory under the “Re´gime de Origem” and mentioned in the TA
(Mercosul 1991, annex II).
CMC/DEC 01/09 is their most recent legal version. The decision defines originat-
ing criteria, the emission process for Mercosul LC certificates, control mechanisms
and sanctions in cases of irregularities. Goods originating from Mercosul have to
fulfill at least one of the following criteria, compare also figure 3.3:
• All input factors for the product are totally obtained in one member country
• All input factors originate exclusively from Mercosul territory
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• Products containing input factors from third party countries have to comply
with:
1. The change in tariff heading criteria. That is, if the transition process
of the good ends in a higher class of the harmonized system compared
to its input factors or
2. if there is no change in heading, a good accounts as originating from
Mercosul, in case more than 60% of its input factors derive from Mer-
cosul territory. This can be summarized under the value added or local
content criterion.
Figure 3.3: Mercosul originating status
Article 6 from the CMC/DEC 01/09 provides the calculation formula for Mercosul
local content compliance:
LC = 1− CIF value of imported goods
FOB value of exported product
· 100 ≥ 60% (3.1)
The LC proportion of a good, remains after subtracting third party input fac-
tors, evaluated on basis of CIF values compared to the FOB value of the exported
good. To account as originating from Mercosul this value has to be superior 60%
(Mercosul/CMC 2009a, Articles 1 - 6).
The Mercosul LC certificate can be issued for all commodities, compliant with
LC requirements, crossing a Mercosul customs border. The document asks for
detailed information on contracting partners, means of transport and a bill of
material of the specific good. Input factors have to be listed with their value,
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country of origin and its dedicated code from the harmonized system. How-
ever, after issuing a LC certificate, the good accounts as 100% originating from
Mercosul (Mercosul/CMC 2009a, Articles 18 - 21).
3.3.2 Automotive sector regulations
The automotive sector in Mercosul represents 25% of interregional trade on Mer-
cosul territory (Malcher 2004, p. 129). The two most important nations in this
industry are Brazil and Argentina, whereof the Argentinean industry relies more
on Mercosul trade than the Brazilian. This is the fundament for ongoing conflicts.
The Argentinean government accuses Brazil to distort competition by granting
subsidies to multinational companies and hinder development of the interregional
free trade. Climax of the conflict was in 1999 when Brazil granted to the Ford
concern a 100 million $ US tax advantage, in exchange for the construction of a
production site in Bahia, Brazil (Malcher 2004, pp. 129).
A Technical Committee for the automotive industry was installed from the very
beginning and asked to submit a proposal for a common Mercosul automotive
regime (IDB-INTAL 1997, pp. 30). Their proposal should point out, how free
trade in the automotive market can be established and how the CET should be
designed. This proposal was meant to be brought in, with the end of 1997 and
realized by end of 2000 (Mercosul/CMC 1994e, Articles 1 - 3).
This ambitious objective could not yet be accomplished. CMC/DEC 70/00 post-
poned the deadline for free trade until January 1st 2006. For the transition period
CET harmonization schemes and calculation methods for the LC were specified
(Mercosul/CMC 2000c).
In 2004 the economical situation changed. Argentina’s automotive products suf-
fered a significant market loss on the Brazilian sales market, due to import sub-
stitution by third party countries. On the opposite, the Brazilian market share
in Argentina rose up to 62%. This imbalance in trade flows lead to a change in
mind of the Argentinean government, requesting for a review on the Mercosul
automotive policy (IDB-INTAL 2006, pp. 61). Hence, negotiations in the sector
went back on a bilateral level between Brazil and Argentina.
The recent valid framework for the two biggest members in Mercosul, Argentina
and Brazil, is their bilateral contract registered in the ALADI as ACE 14 with
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its 39 additional protocols. The latest protocol validates the ACE 14 until June
30th 2014 and administrates:
• The common external tariff is set to 35% for final products like cars,
omnibuses, trucks and tractors. For automotive parts, the Mercosul CET
applies. All automotive goods are clustered into categories, the member-
ship to a specific category can be seen through consulting the Harmonized
System table, where every item is attached to a specific category, compare
figure 3.4 (ALADI 2010, Article 3, Annex).
Figure 3.4: Classification of automotive goods (ALADI 2010, Article 7)
• Parts non-receivable in Mercosul can be imported to a preferential tariff
of 2% (ALADI 2010, Article 6).
• Trade volume limits were introduced to restrict free trade between both
countries, due to Argentina’s described trade deficit. Thereto, a coefficient
is used. The so called “flex”, limits maximum exportation amounts. For
every $ US exported from Argentina to Brazil, Brazil may import up to $
US 1.95 to Argentina. On the contrary, Argentina’s “flex” was set to 2.5,
for every $ US imported from Brazil, Argentina is allowed to export up to
the factor 2.5 of this value (ALADI 2010, Article 11).
• In order to determine the originating status of a good, a LC calculation
method for the automotive sector, the “´ındice de Conteu´do Regional (ICR)”
was legislated (ALADI 2010, Article 16).
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ICR = 1− CIF value of imported goods
ex factory value without taxes
· 100 ≥ 60% (3.2)
Latter formula is valid for the categories of final products, and refers to letters
a - f, from figure 3.4. For automotive parts the general Mercosul LC formula
as explained under formula 3.1 applies (ALADI 2010, Article 16). Furthermore,
article 18 of the agreement refers to a special case of interest, the introduction of
new models. The requested ICR raises step by step beginning with 40% in the
first year, 50% in the second and 60% from the third year on, in order to consider
the start-up phase of these products (ALADI 2010, Article 17).
3.3.3 Special Brazilian non-tariff trade barrier: Finame
This section presents a specific non-tariff trade barrier from Brazil. The Brazil-
ian development bank (Banco nacional de desenvolvimento - BNDES) grants for
investments in new national machinery and equipment, produced in Brazil favor-
able development loans (BNDES 2006, bullet 4.1). Objective is the progression
and support of the Brazilian economy opposite increasing competition.
Fundable are assets registered at the “credenciamento de Fabricantes informati-
zado (CFI)”, a data base accessible via the Internet. For the admission into the
CFI a product or equipment has to fulfill the “ind´ıce de nacionalizac¸a˜o (IN)”.
The IN is comparable to a LC requirement with one additional specific character-
istic. In addition, to a certain value added request, there is a further requirement
for a minimum weight added. An asset accounts as originating, if in both cases
the aliquot of local input added is superior 60% (BNDES 2006, Article 4).
Formula 3.3 refers to the calculation of local value added. In addition to the CIF
value of an imported good, paid customs duties are included into the enumerator
and account therefore as non-originating. Denominator is the intern market price
of the asset without taxes (BNDES 2010, Article 13 No. 1).
Formula 3.4 presents the calculation of local weight added. Imported input fac-
tors of a product are assessed by their weight and subsequently contrasted with
the total weight of the final product (BNDES 2010, Article 13 No. 2). In both
cases a minimum proportion of 60% has to be fulfilled.
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1. IN by value
Inv = 1− CIF value of imported goods + customs duties
intern market price without taxes
· 100 ≥ 60%
(3.3)
2. IN by weight
Inw = 1− summarized weight of imported goods
total weight of product
· 100 ≥ 60% (3.4)
Figure 3.5 illustrates the application process for the development loan. If, a
Brazilian carrier plans to buy a new truck financed through a BNDES devel-
opment loan, he needs to choose an approved product from the CFI register.
Thereon, he can insert his application for the loan concerning the specific truck
with a contract bank, equally approved through the BNDES. Applicants never
have direct contact to the BNDES. After verifying the request in terms of compli-
ance, the development loan is granted and disbursed through the contract bank.
Figure 3.5: Finame application and approval process
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3.3.4 Summary and application of non-tariff trade
barriers
In the following is given a summary for the beforehand introduced Mercosul
non-tariff trade barriers, especially on the LC and Finame calculation methods.
Priority is put on the concrete application for the automotive industry and how
these requirements can be implemented into the optimization process of a global
production network of a truck manufacturer. Therefore, five different cases are
introduced, which need to be distinguished during the calculation process. At
first, the calculation of Mercosul LC is presented, based on the five cases, followed
by the description for the Finame characteristics.
3.3.4.1 Mercosul LC
The Mercosul legal framework for the automotive industry pinpoints two differ-
ent calculation methods for local content purpose. One for automotive parts,
compare formula 3.1 and additionally, another for final products presented under
formula 3.2. Both have in common their enumerator, the CIF-value of imported
goods. Furthermore, described as the value of non-originating material (VNM).
The identification of the VNM is, consequently, the focus of interest.
Figure 3.6: Network supply variations
For the Mercosul LC, the VNM is calculated on basis of every possible network
36
3 Mercosul
supply variation of a product. By network supply variation, a set of all possible
production options for one product is described, which is available throughout
the global production network of the truck manufacturer. Figure 3.6 gives an
example on the determination of all possible variations inside a given network.
In the set-up three production plants are available, each of them able to produce
specific components. Given the assumption, the three-staged bill of material looks
as illustrated, 96 different network supply variations for the truck are generated,
composing through: three possibilities for producing the shortblock, multiplied
by two possibilities for producing the engine parts, multiplied by two possible
engine production sites and so on, ending up in 96 network supply variations for
the particular truck type. However, for each of them a different VNM, relating to
Mercosul LC and Finame regulations, has to be determined. Thus, different LC
and Finame characteristics are possible for every truck variation. It needs to be
pinpointed for every iteration in the production process, where its specific value
was generated and if the value accounts as local added.
Consequently, five different cases for the VNM calculation are provided, respec-
tively to the location of producing plants as well as LC fulfillment of antecessors
components. As antecessor components are labeled all parts necessary, for as-
sembling a product variation, defined by the subordinated stages from the bill of
material. The classification into the cases is necessary, to enable an exact tracing
of the VNM of every product or component throughout the global production
network. Indeed, every case ends up in different summing of antecessor compo-
nents and VNM calculation.
Figure 3.7: Stages of the production process
Figure 3.7 illustrates the stages of a generalized production process for an exem-
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plary final product. It describes a bottom up approach, defining the subcompo-
nents of the lowest level as first stage with an ascending enumeration to the top.
Consequently, these stages are referred to when it comes to the VNM calculation
via the five cases presented in the following.
Figure 3.8: Process chart Mercosul local content
The process chart 3.8 illustrates the five cases and the conditions leading to them.
The decision for the appropriate formula is at first dependent on the location of
the particular production plant. Is it based on Mercosul territory or not? In case
the plant can be found on Mercosul territory, the next information needed is: Is
the upstream plant located in the same country or not? In case these two coun-
tries differ, every component has to be screened separately in terms of Mercosul
LC compliance and location of the upstream plant, with regard to the union of
interest.
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When determining the VNM of a product, it is essential to strictly follow the
bottom up principle. VNM calculation and therefore Mercosul LC stipulations al-
ways start on the lowest level of the production process, working its way through
the scheme. This is caused by the fact that for the VNM calculation at every
stage, the data concerning antecessor components are needed. With exception to
the first stage, where input data on the VNM are necessary, for every consequent
stage the VNM calculation process starts with identifying the proper case. This
is followed by determining the VNM and therefore the Mercosul LC compliance
of the component. This proceeding is repeated step by step for every stage of the
production process, until the final level is achieved.
ωlcifu =

1 if
∑˜
i∈I
Bi˜i = 0 and i˜ 6= i
0 else
∀i ∈ I, u ∈ U, f ∈ Fi ∩ Fu (3.5)
Formula 3.5 allocates to every component without any antecessors,
∑˜
i∈I
Bi˜i = 0,
originating on Mercosul territory a LC of 100%. This reflects the necessary input
data for the first stage of the production process in order to enable the following
VNM calculation proceeding for the subsequent stages.
In the following, the methodology for Mercosul LC determination is presented.
Figure 3.9 illustrates this procedure. In a first step necessary parameters need to
be initialized. Consequently, strictly tracking the bottom up approach, the VNM
for components and products of each stage is calculated. The calculation is de-
pendent on the applicable case. In a last step, to every product or component is
allocated its specific LC characteristic, the binary parameter ωlcifu. This process
is repeated for all components and products until the final production stage is
achieved.
Subsequently, the algorithm is described. Line one and two initialize the nec-
essary control parameters and activate the loop for the bottom up approach of
VNM calculation for Mercosul LC purpose. Along with lines four to eight comes
the summing of the particular component or product variation’s VNM, with re-
gard to the detected case. Hereby, the values of all components and assemblies of
non-originating materials as well as their transport (CIF) are summarized. The
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Figure 3.9: Outline algorithm for Mercosul LC calculation
algorithm concludes with the assignment of the Mercosul LC characteristic for
the component or product variant. If the good exceeds the necessary LC request
ρlcu it is classified as LC fulfilling and the binary parameter ω
lc
ifu approves the
value one. In a last step the algorithm increases the count for the production
stage and as long as the final stage of the production process is not yet obtained,
the proceeding is repeated.
Algorithm for Mercosul LC determination
1: initialize control parameters
2: forall k = 2,...,n do
3: forall i ∈ Ik, u ∈ U, n ∈ N, f ∈ Fn,m ∈Mu do
4: if case 1 then
V norifu = C
shipM
ifm +
∑˜
i∈I
∑˜
f∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
)
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5: elseif case 2 then
V norifu =
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi\Fn
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
)
6: elseif case 3 then
V norifu =
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜∩Fu
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
) = 0
7: elseif case 4 then
V norifu =
∑˜
i∈I
∑˜
f∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
)
8: elseif case 5 then
V norifu =
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜\Fu
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
)
9: end if
10: if ( 1− V
nor
ifu
P lcim
≥ ρlcu ) then
11: ωlcifu = 1
12: else
13: ωlcifu = 0
14: end if
15: k + 1
16: end do
17: end do
Below, every case is discussed in detail, highlighting their specifications in
terms of determining the VNM. Every case is described in a general manner for
a n-staged production process, concluding with an illustrative example. For the
example a three-staged production process is assumed, hypothesizing that the
Mercosul LC characteristics of all antecessor components to the truck are known
already.
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Case 1:
Under this set-up, the production site is located outside the regarded union. In a
first step, all direct antecessor (previous stage to the one regarded) of the prod-
uct variation and their LC fulfillment are considered. In case of not fulfilling, the
VNM is calculated by summing up all antecessor components not possessing a
LC certificate by their CIF value. Furthermore, production costs as well as the
transport to the designated market account as non-originating.
Figure 3.10 illustrates these circumstances. The truck production is located in
the EU, receiving parts from the Mercosul area and the EU. However, as VNM
account the 9 (all numbers are given in a generalized monetary unit) for the EU
shortblock, plus 6 for producing the engine not fulfilling Mercosul LC. Further
have to be added 25 for the truck fabrication as well as the 5 necessary for trans-
porting the truck to its designated sales market Mercosul, all together, the VNM
equals 45.
Figure 3.10: Case 1
Case 2:
The underlying set-up in case 2 locates the production plant as well as the up-
stream plant of the direct antecessor in the same country, a Mercosul member.
Thus, no LC certificates for components are issued, as no border crossing is re-
alized. The VNM is composed by all antecessor components not fulfilling the
Mercosul LC. Figure 3.11 displays the chosen set-up. Truck and engine produc-
tion are allocated in Brazil. Therefore, as VNM for the truck account the 9 of
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the EU shortblock plus 2 for its transport, the Argentinean engine parts fulfill
LC and are not included into the VNM. All together the VNM equals 11.
Figure 3.11: Case 2
Case 3:
Case 3 allocates the production plant as well as the upstream plant in different
member states of the Mercosul territory. The upstream production site delivers
a direct antecessor component, compliant to Mercosul LC. Therefore, a Mercosul
LC certificate can be requested and the VNM of the direct antecessor equals 0.
In the described case under figure 3.12, an Argentinean production plant delivers
a Mercosul LC compliant engine to a Brazilian plant. The VNM of the engine
equals 0, even though, EU engine parts were used. The engine itself received a
LC certificate and accounts as a 100% originating.
Figure 3.12: Case 3
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Case 4:
The production plant, located on Mercosul territory, is now served with a direct
antecessor, not fulfilling Mercosul LC, by an upstream plant located in a third
party country. Hence, account as VNM all antecessors not compliant to Merco-
sul LC as well as their production and transportation costs. Figure 3.13 gives an
example: the Brazilian plant is served with an EU engine, not fulfilling LC. For
the production of the engine Mercosul engine parts are used. Hence, the VNM
includes only parts obtained outside the Mercosul: 9 for the EU shortblock plus
6 for manufacturing the engine as well as 2 for its transport. Ending up in a total
VNM of 17 for the truck.
Figure 3.13: Case 4
Case 5:
Case 5 includes a border crossing inside the Mercosul territory. Delivered is a
direct antecessor not fulfilling Mercosul LC from the upstream production plant.
Therefore, all prior not LC compliant components are considered for the VNM,
except the direct antecessors fabrication, which was realized on Mercosul terri-
tory. Figure 3.14 illustrates this case. The Brazilian truck production site is
equipped with an engine, not compliant with Mercosul LC, from the Argentinean
plant. The VNM for the truck includes the 9 for the EU shortblock, plus 2 for its
transport. Further engine parts are produced on Mercosul territory, accounting
as originating like the production of the engine itself.
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Figure 3.14: Case 5
3.3.4.2 Determination of Finame fulfillment
Section 3.3.3 already introduced the conceptual framework of the Finame require-
ments. The favorable development loan is only granted, if the prerequisites in
value and weight are fulfilled.
In order to calculate the VNM and non-originating weight for the Finame restric-
tion the identical proceeding as explained under Mercosul LC calculation needs
to be followed. For every stage of the production process the VNM and non-
originating weight has to be identified from the bottom up. Moreover, in general
the same cases can be detected, as described under the Mercosul LC calculation,
to determine the Finame VNM and the Finame non-originating weight for every
network supply variation. Nevertheless, the approach is modified by two items:
• Because the enumerator of the Finame formula includes additional customs
duties for calculating the VNM, all determined costs are multiplied by their
import duty rate.
• The focus switches from Mercosul to Brazil. Thus, as VNM and non-
originating weight account all non-Brazilian materials, or materials not
featuring a Mercosul LC certificate. A differentiation between, Mercosul
LC cases four and five is no longer necessary, as explained in the follwoing.
Figure 3.15 displays the process chart. It describes the same decisions, necessary
for Mercosul LC calculation, leading to the four different cases relevant for Fi-
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name calculations. Considered are locations of production plants and upstream
production plants as well as Mercosul LC fulfillments of antecessor components.
Figure 3.15: Process chart Finame
In the following the methodology for Finame compliance in value and weight is
presented. Figure 3.16 displays the approach of the algorithm. The proceeding
is similar to the Mercosul LC VNM stipulation. Consequently, the bottom up
approach with regard to Finame VNM and non-originating weight calculation is
presented. The resulting values are contrasted with the Finame requirements to
determine the goods compliance.
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Figure 3.16: Outline algorithm for Finame characteristics calculation
Algorithm for Finame determination
1: initialize control parameters
2: forall k = 2,...,n do
3: forall i ∈ Ik, f ∈ Fi, u ∈ U,m ∈Mu, n = Brazil do
4: if case 1 then
V norF inif = αin ·(CshipMifm +
∑˜
i∈I
∑˜
f∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
)·Bi˜i ·(Cvari˜f˜ +C
shipF
i˜f˜f
))
W norF inif =
∑˜
i∈I
∑˜
f∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i ·Wi˜
5: elseif case 2 then
V norF inif = αi˜n · (
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜\Fn
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
))
W norF inif =
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜\Fn
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i ·Wi˜
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6: elseif case 3 then
V norF inif = αi˜n ·(
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜∩Fu
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
)·Bi˜i ·(Cvari˜f˜ +C
shipF
i˜f˜f
)) = 0
W norF inif =
∑˜
i∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜∩Fu
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i ·Wi˜ = 0
7: elseif case 4 then
V norF inif = αi˜n · (
∑˜
i∈I
∑˜
f∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + C
shipF
i˜f˜f
))
W norF inif =
∑˜
i∈I
∑˜
f∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) ·Bi˜i ·Wi˜
8: end if
9: if ( 1− V
norFin
if
PFinim
≥ ρFinn and
1− W
norFin
if
Wi
≥ ρFinn ) then
10: ωFinif = 1
11: else
12: ωFinif = 0
13: end if
14: k + 1
15: end do
16: end do
Line one and two initialize again the relevant control parameters and start the
loop for the calculation process beginning with stage two. Necessary data for the
first stage are obtained the same way as for Mercosul LC determination. Line
four to seven return the procedure for Finame VNM and non-originating weight
computation, constrained to the particular case applied. Line nine determines, if
the product or component is compliant with the Finame requirement in value and
weight ρFinn . In case of fulfillment the binary parameter, ω
Fin
if approves the value
one. Line 14 increases the count of the loop and as long as the final production
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stage is not achieved the procedure is repeated.
Case 4 Finame:
Case 4 determines the VNM, if a production plant is located in Brazil and served
with direct antecessors not fulfilling Mercosul LC from outside the country. Since,
Finame focuses on Brazil, the VNM accounts for all actions obtained abroad. It
does not matter, if the upstream production plant is located inside or outside
the Mercosul territory. No further differentiation between cases four and five is
necessary. Imported goods are evaluated by their CIF-value, less Mercosul LC
compliant antecessors.
Figure 3.17: Case 4 Finame
In the described example under figure 3.17, a truck production is located in
Brazil, serving the Brazilian market. However, an EU cab and an engine from
Argentina are included into the truck variant, both without Mercosul LC cer-
tificate. Hence, the VNM consists of the 15 for the cab plus 3 for its transport.
Further, the Argentinean engine production is added with 6 plus 11 for the EU
shortblock. Since, the rest of the engine parts are compliant with Mercosul LC,
they are not included. Total VNM under this set-up equals 35.
Beneath the value criterion, Finame requests for a minimum local weight added.
Its calculation is done by formula 3.4. To determine the non-originating weight
of a component or product, once again is referred to the bottom up calculation
proceeding. Throughout the production program every stage is evaluated sepa-
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rately, respectively to non-originating weight. The same four cases as under the
VNM calculation for Finame purpose need to be distinguished. Instead, of CIF
values plus customs duties the non-originating weights are summed up in the
enumerator and contrasted with the total weight of the component or product at
the production stage currently regarded. If, both criterions, the local value added
and local weight added are superior 60% the Finame requirement is fulfilled and
the product can be registered with the BNDES.
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Part of this chapter is a detailed explanation and formulation for a production
network design and capacity planning model. In comparison to already existing
models, which take decisions on global aspects as LC, duties and duty drawbacks
into consideration, compare e.g. Arntzen et al. (1995) and Oh and Karimi (2006)
the subsequent model formulation differs and therefore extends the existing lit-
erature in three specifications.
First, the model is capable to calculate LC characteristics on a product specific
level. For every product variation of the multi-product environment the specific
LC of the network supply variant is considered. Second, a detailed consideration
of inward and outward processing schemes is implemented. Especially, the mod-
elling of the customs regime outward processing with its associated ad valorem
payment of duty, describes an extension to the existing literature. The model
calculates the specific duty load on basis of the single delivered product, regard-
ing every incorporated component and its origin. Therefore, the ad valorem duty
load when crossing a customs border can be determined exactly. Third, through
the implementation of the Mercosul legal framework with reference to LC, du-
ties, duty drawbacks and the Finame requirement, detailed conclusions for this
economic area are possible. This is especially interesting as calculation methods
vary a lot between different PTAs and a generalized treatment may lead to sub-
optimal solutions for the production network configuration.
4.1 Problem statement and assumptions
The following developed model is based on the automotive sector, with special
focus on Mercosul. A truck manufacturer holds different production plants placed
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inside and outside the Mercosul territory. All necessary components for the trucks
are produced inside the manufacturer’s inbound production network. Hence, the
necessary capacity planning for all production lines is incorporated into the model
formulation.
Between plants and markets occur component and product deliveries. Compo-
nents are delivered at CIF values. Final products are shipped to sales markets,
where the manufacturer acts as a price taker. All prices and costs are translated
into a common currency. For every shipment to a production plant or sales mar-
ket, various circumstances have to be considered and therefore, be implemented
in the model:
• Are components or products shipped cross a border?
• If there has taken place a border crossing concerning Mercosul, are the
goods fulfilling Mercosul LC requirements?
• Have duties to be charged?
• Is the underlying shipment a case of inward or outward processing and can
therefore duty drawbacks be claimed?
• Are products delivered to the Brazilian market compliant with Finame?
For the Mercosul LC and Finame regulation, VNM is calculated on basis of every
possible network supply variation as explained under section 3.3.4. Components
without any antecessors originating on Mercosul territory possess a Mercosul LC
of 100%.
Thus, it is necessary to be aware of the different variations possible and how they
are composed. This is done by a multilevel bill of material matrix (BOM) (Dyck-
hoff 2006, pp. 279). It is defined for all components and products, underlying the
optimization problem. An index can stand for a component as well as a product
in its different network supply variation.
Table 4.1 illustrates for a simple example the composition and configuration of
the BOM. Thereto, the final product is identified with the index 1. It consists
of two times component 2 and one time component 3, whereas component 2 is
further split into one time component 4 as well as 5. This mixture is illustrated
by the BOM in the following. Columns reflect for the product or component
regarded all subcomponents necessary, unrelated to the stages of the production
process. Therefore, an overview on the complete composition can be obtained.
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Table 4.1: Composition bill of material matrix
However, rows return information on products or components incorporating the
specific part, with its quantity.
Figure 4.1: Exemplary production line
For capacity planning purpose product and component types are introduced ad-
ditionally, compare figure 4.1. Thus, products and components can further be
distinguished into different types, whereas they consume the same capacity at the
associated production line. For example, the product truck can be differentiated
into medium duty and heavy duty, both consuming the same capacity units at
the production line truck. The model is enabled to decide, which production
network configuration and capacity planning decisions are optimal, concerning
fulfilling demand, while minimizing fixed costs and investments.
Concluding all assumptions underlying the model formulation are given clustered
in an enumeration:
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• All data are modelled deterministically
• Demands have to be fulfilled completely
• Product and component flows are based on CIF values
• Components completely produced on Mercosul territory possess a Mercosul
LC of 100%
• Mercosul LC calculation is based on the non-originating value of every
possible network supply variation
• All costs are translated into a common currency
• The manufacturer acts as price taker at the sales markets
• All types of a component or product consume the same amount of capacity
at the specific production line during their production process
• Inventory decisions are not taken into account, products and components
cannot be stored
The consequent model development is organized as follows. First, the basic model
is introduced. This formulation is further extended by the Brazilian non-tariff
trade barrier Finame and a second extension dealing with capacity planning de-
cisions.
4.2 Basic model
This section presents the mathematical formulation of the mixed integer program.
To begin with, the basic model is presented, including its key elements demand
satisfaction under capacity restrictions, network flows as well as duty and duty
drawback calculation constraints. Furthermore, the model is extended, firstly by
the Finame fulfillment and secondly by capacity planning decisions.
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4.2.1 Objective function
min NPV COSTS =
∑
t∈T
Rt ·
[∑
i∈I
∑
f∈Fi
(4.1)[ ∑
m∈M
zifmt · Cvarif + (4.2)∑
i′∈I
∑
f ′∈F
i
′
∑
m∈M
yshipF
ii′ff ′mt · C
shipF
iff ′ + (4.3)∑
m∈M
yshipMifmt · CshipMifm + (4.4)∑
n∈N
∑
f ′∈Fn
∑
f∈Fn
(dshipF
iff ′ t − dd
shipF
iff ′ t ) · αin+ (4.5)
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈Mn
dshipMifmt · αin
]]
(4.6)
In order to derive an optimal solution the program minimizes costs. Therefore,
costs are summed up and discounted periodically by a factor, i.e. the negative
net present value of costs is minimized.
Companies use the net present value (NPV) to evaluate their investments. It
is calculated by the difference of the discounted cash flow of sales, less the net
present value of costs. Thus, costs are minimized to generate the best possible
NPV, a manufacturer acting as a price taker, can achieve.
The objective function may be divided into different formulas. Line 4.1 intro-
duces the discount factor, relevant for all sequent periods. Line 4.2 determines
the production costs for the produced quantities of all component and product
variations per period, while under 4.3 and 4.4 the costs of their shipments be-
tween plants and markets are determined.
Formula 4.5 subtracts the customs value of all duty drawbacks from the total
customs value paid per period. Potential duty payments for serving the sales
markets with products are calculated under 4.6.
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4.2.2 Constraints
Demand constraint ∑
i∈Iq
∑
f∈F
yshipMifmt = Dqmt (4.7)
∀q ∈ Q,m ∈M, t ∈ T
Restriction 4.7 ensures that distribution quantities to each market per period
fulfill the demand for all requested product types over all periods. Demand has
to be fully served.
Capacity constraint ∑
i∈Ip
∑
m∈M
zifmt ≤ Kpfl (4.8)
∀p ∈ P, f ∈ F, t ∈ T, l ∈ L
Constraint 4.8 ensures that the produced quantities at a production plant do not
exceed the available capacities of its production lines.
Network flow constraints∑
i′∈I
∑
f ′∈F
i
′
yshipF
ii′ff ′mt + y
shipM
ifmt = zifmt (4.9)
∀i ∈ I, f ∈ Fi,m ∈M, t ∈ T
∑
f˜∈Fi˜
yshipF
i˜if˜fmt
= Bi˜i · zifmt (4.10)
∀i ∈ I, i˜ ∈ Ai, f ∈ Fi,m ∈M, t ∈ T
The flow constraints assure the harmonization of all component and product flows
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as well as their production quantities. Under 4.9 is provided that all amounts
shipped, either to plants or sales markets, are produced anyhow. Equation 4.10
includes the BOM, thereby, is assured that every component or product variant
is supplied by its appropriate quantities of direct needed antecessors. The restric-
tions imply that no storage of component or product variations take place.
Duty constraints for shipments between production plants
dshipF
iff ′ t =
∑
i′∈I
∑
m∈M
yshipF
ii′ff ′mt · ( 1 − ωlcifu) ·[∑
i˜∈I
∑
f˜∈FP
f
′
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) · Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + CshipFi˜f˜f ) + C
shipF
iff ′
]
(4.11)
∀u ∈ U, i ∈ I, f ∈ Fi ∩ Fn, f ′ ∈ Fu ∩ FPf , t ∈ T
Restriction 4.11 calculates for every shipment between two production plants its
customs value. However, duties have to be paid every time a good crosses a
customs border, expressed by f
′ ∈ FPf , the receiving production plant f ′ is lo-
cated in a different nation compared to f . By the time, a good is imported into
a preferential trade area u, whilst fulfilling the union’s specific LC requirement,
ωlcifu = 1, no duty payments are necessary.
Figure 4.2: Duties and duty drawbacks
The customs value of a good is composed by its CIF value, less obtained ante-
cessor components i˜, fulfilling an originating status, ωlc
i˜f˜u
= 1, at the union of the
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importing production plant f
′
. Figure 4.2 gives therefore, an example. At the
production plant in Europe a truck engine is produced with parts from Europe
as well as Brazil. Assuming, the engine is integrated into a truck assembly in
Brazil, import duties for the engine have to be paid as it does not fulfill Mercosul
LC. The customs value comprises of the CIF value from the engine less the val-
ues of containing antecessor components compliant with Mercosul LC, here, the
shortblock. Thus, the customs value of the engine equals 22. For the imported
Brazilian shortblock EU, import duties have to be paid as it does not originate
from the EU. However, a duty drawback is granted, since the shortblock takes
part in the inward processing of the engine at the EU plant.
Duty drawback constraint
ddshipF
iff ′ t =
∑
i′∈I
∑
m∈MP
f
′
yshipF
ii′ff ′mt · ( 1 − ωlcifu) ·[∑
i˜∈I
∑
f˜∈FP
f
′
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) · Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + CshipFi˜f˜f ) + C
shipF
iff ′
]
(4.12)
∀u ∈ U, i ∈ I, f ∈ Fi ∩ Fn, f ′ ∈ Fu ∩ FPf , t ∈ T
Duty drawbacks are modelled in constraint 4.12, returning the customs value of
drawbacks on shipments between production plants. In contrast, to constraint
4.11, drawbacks on beforehand calculated duties are claimed, if the importing
plant is not located in the same nation, as the future aim market of the compo-
nent or product variant, compare m ∈ MPf ′ . Hence, is implied that a further
border crossing takes place and the good is part of an outward or inward process-
ing, enabling duty drawbacks. The calculation of the customs value for drawbacks
is done congruent to 4.11.
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Duty constraints for shipments to sales markets
dshipMifmt = y
shipM
ifmt · ( 1 − ωlcifu) ·[∑
i˜∈I
∑
f˜∈Fi˜
( 1 − ωlc
i˜f˜u
) · Bi˜i · (Cvari˜f˜ + CshipFi˜f˜f ) + C
shipM
ifm
]
(4.13)
∀u ∈ U, i ∈ I, f ∈ Fi ∩ Fn,m ∈Mu ∩MPf , t ∈ T
Constraint 4.13 detects duty payments on shipments for sales markets. The
model distinguishes between shipments to plants and shipments to sales markets.
Hence, both shipment flows have to be regarded separately, due to the model
layout. Nevertheless, the systematic of handling is the same, adopted by the fact
that the destination is a sales market located in a different nation compared to the
production plant, see m ∈ MPf . Customs value of the demand serving product
is its CIF value reduced by the value of antecessors fulfilling an originating status
at the destination.
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4.3 Extension I: Finame
In a first extension is included the consideration of Finame compliance for serving
the Brazilian market. Therefore, a decision variable is introduced, detecting, if
all delivered product variations fulfill the Finame request. In case, this is not
provided a penalty per every delivered product unit may be considered in the
objective function. This penalty reflects the additional costs occurring for the
manufacturer to compensate his customers, which cannot apply for the favorable
development loan.
Constraint ∑
i∈Iq
∑
f∈Fi
yshipMifmt · ωFinif ≥ Dqmt − (ψpenaltyqt ·BigM) (4.14)
∀q ∈ Q,m ∈MB, t ∈ T
The Finame constraint 4.14 screens for all product variations of one type, des-
ignated to the Brazilian market, if they comply with Finame value and weight
requirements. For every network supply variation of a product the Finame pa-
rameter ωFinif was calculated beforehand.
If the restriction’s left hand side, the delivered amount of Finame compliant prod-
uct type variants to the Brazilian sales market is smaller than the total Brazilian
demand, the binary decision variable ψpenaltyqt is set to 1. A sufficient big number
”BigM” needs to be subtracted to restore the accuracy of the constraint. The
binary variable ψpenaltyqt recurs in the objective function, where penalty payments
are added.
Objective function - extension∑
t∈T
Rt ·
∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈Iq
∑
f∈Fi
∑
m∈MB
yshipMifmt · ψpenaltyqt · Cpenaltyt (4.15)
Formula 4.15 is added to the objective function, triggering penalty payments,
if not all product type variants serving Brazilian demand are compliant with the
Finame requests. In this case penalty payments occur for every sold unit of this
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type at the Brazilian sales market. The development loan can only be granted,
if the product is registered at the BNDES and therefore all its network supply
variants have to be compliant with Finame requests.
4.4 Extension II: Capacity planning
The second extension deals with capacity planning decisions. At every plant,
capacity levels for production lines are introduced. Different types of products
and components are allocated on the same production lines, consuming the same
capacity. In the following, the necessary constraints for production line capacity
planning are introduced. Constraints, needed for the component and product
type to plant allocation are provided in a second step. Finally, the extension to
the objective function is presented.
Production line constraints∑
i∈Ip
∑
m∈M
zifmt ≤
∑
l∈L
Kpfl · ψactiveKpflt (4.16)
∀p ∈ P, f ∈ F, t ∈ T
∑
l∈L
ψactiveKpflt = 1 (4.17)
∀p ∈ P, f ∈ F, t ∈ T
ψactiveKp,f,l=0,t=0 = 1 (4.18)
∀p ∈ P, f ∈ F
ψactiveK
pfl′ t + ψ
activeK
pflt−1 − 1 ≤ ψswKpfll′ t (4.19)
∀p ∈ P, f ∈ F, l l′ ∈ L, t ∈ T
To every production plant, production lines are allocated, which can adopt dif-
ferent specifications, so called capacity levels. Product and component variants
are clustered by the subsets Ip and allocated to these capacities.
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The first capacity constraint 4.16 guarantees that the active level of the pro-
duction line provides sufficient capacity for the produced quantity. The active
capacity level for a production line at a plant is defined through the binary deci-
sion variable ψactiveKpflt , adopting the value 1 for active or 0 for non-active levels.
Formula 4.17 allows for every product at each site only one active capacity level
per period. In period t = 0 constraint 4.18 determines the initial capacity level
l = 0 for all production lines. An imaginary level, where no capacities are avail-
able and therefore, no predetermined network configuration is defined. This can
be changed to a different initial situation, by adopting the adequate capacity
levels.
Switches between capacity levels are detected through formula 4.19. In case, dif-
ferent capacity levels are active in two sequent periods, the formula forces ψswK
ifll′ t
to adopt the value 1 and switching costs are included into the objective function.
However, if there is no capacity switch at a plant, ψswK
ifll′ t might also approve the
value of 1 but as this activates switching costs in the objective function the allo-
cated value equals 0.
Product and component type to plant allocation constraints∑
i∈Iq
∑
m∈M
zifmt ≤ ψlinkqf ·BigM (4.20)
∀q ∈ Q, f ∈ F, t ∈ T
Constraint 4.20 allocates a particular product or component type to a plant
and therefore to its associated production line. The allocation is modelled by the
binary decision variable ψlinkqf adopting the value 1, in case a production of a par-
ticular component or product type takes place at the plant. Further, is assured
that this decision once taken is proceeded over all periods during the optimiza-
tion process. Linking a product or component type to a plant is connected with
setup costs necessary for the configuration of machines or training the work force.
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Objective function - extension∑
p∈P
∑
f∈F
∑
l∈L
CinvKpfl · ψactiveKpfl0 + (4.21)∑
q∈Q
∑
f∈F
Csetupqf · ψlinkqf + (4.22)
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F
Rt ·
[
(4.23)∑
p∈P
∑
l∈L
CfixKpflt · ψactiveKpflt + (4.24)
∑
p∈P
∑
l,l′∈L
CswK
pfll′ · ψswKpfll′ t
]
(4.25)
Finally, these are the extensions to the objective function, concerning capac-
ity planning. Formula 4.21 determines the initial investments for the capacity
levels necessary in period t = 0, while formula 4.22 introduces the setup costs
activated through the linking of component and product types to the production
plants. These investments have to be realized at the beginning of the process
and are therefore not discounted. Formula 4.24 adds periodical fixed costs for
active capacity levels of a production line in a plant. In case of capacity switches,
characteristic switching costs are included by line 4.25.
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The illustration of the impact of duties, duty drawbacks, LC and Finame require-
ments on production decisions of a multinational truck manufacturer is the main
intention of this chapter. Focus is set on the examination, how global aspects
affect the production strategy of a multinational corporation and therefore its
production network. A further research question is, if product flexible produc-
tion networks can be useful when coping with considerable global challenges. The
following chapter examines the influence of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and
their legal frameworks at the Mercosul territory on the production network con-
figuration of a truck manufacturer.
In different studies the advantages of the developed mathematical optimization
model are highlighted. In the first study, interactions of duties, LC requirements
and duty drawbacks are examined, in a single-product, single-period environ-
ment.
In contrast, the second study enlarges the problem statement by reviewing an
extended time framework and introducing capacity planning decisions. Through
parameter variations knowledge on the interactions of the incorporated aspects
is concluded. In a third study the impact of the particular Brazilian non-tariff
trade barrier, Finame, on the production network design is examined.
5.1 Test design
The numerical studies are based on the planning problems of an international
truck manufacturer producing one type of truck. Figure 5.1 gives an overview on
the underlying network and its sales markets. Trucks can be produced in three
different plants, Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR) and the European Union (EU).
Two of them are located on Mercosul territory. Sales markets taken into account
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Figure 5.1: Network structure
are AR, BR and the EU.
Throughout all case studies a three-staged bill of material for the truck, compare
figure 5.2 is regarded. Components from the first, the second and the final stage
are produced inside the global production network of the truck manufacturer.
Production plants are fully flexible and therefore capable to fabricate all compo-
nents, given by the BOM as well as assembling the truck. The BOM considers
the most valuable parts of a truck: cab, engine and chassis, whilst the built up of
the chassis is part of the truck assembly process. The BOM further divides the
engine into shortblock and remaining engine parts.
Figure 5.2: Network supply variations per truck
The set-up under fully flexible production plants and the three-staged BOM re-
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sults in 243 network supply variations for the truck. This is composed through
multiplying all producing and assembly opportunities with each other.
Every network supply variant shows a different VNM and thereby, a different
LC and Finame proportion. Mercosul LC and Finame quota for the three-staged
BOM are calculated accordingly to the formulas presented under section 3.3.1.
Components without any antecessors produced in a Mercosul plant possess a LC
of 100%.
Table 5.1: Summary production costs
Table 5.1 introduces the material costs, working hours per component or prod-
uct and weights of a truck. These data represent realistic but altered values,
provided by the truck manufacturer. All costs are converted into a common cur-
rency, $ US. Weight information illustrated in the last column of the table provide
generalized average values on all parts. These values are necessary for Finame
non-originating weight calculation.
Material costs for at truck at the Brazilian plant are reduced by 2 % compared to
the Argentinean plant, due to more favorable logistic conditions and a stronger
Brazilian Real opposite the Argentinean Peso. Material costs for at truck at the
EU plant are cut down by 18% compared to the Argentinean plant. Production
materials can be sourced cheaper through the opportunity of utilizing low-cost
suppliers from Eastern Europe.
Working hours reflect the need for industrial labor to fabricate the specific prod-
uct or component. Due to the same production technologies at all plants, working
hours necessary for manufacturing a product or component do not differ between
the sites.
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Table 5.2: Industrial labor costs
Table 5.2 introduces the costs for one hour of industrial labor at the production
plants. At the EU site labor costs are significantly higher with 60 $ US compared
to 18 $ US in Brazil and 14 $ US in Argentina (Kaufmann, Panhans, Poovan
and Sobotka 2005). Total costs are obtained through adding up material and
labor costs.
Following, transportation costs are presented. They depend on realistic but al-
tered container freight rates provided by the truck manufacturer and the quantity
included into one container, compare table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Composition transportation costs
Trucks are shipped via the so called roll-on roll-off traffic, therefore no containers
are necessary. Nevertheless, for all trucks the same costs as provided for container
rates apply. Between the production lines of one particular plant, it is assumed
that no logistic costs have to be paid.
Table 5.4: Duty rates
To conclude the data framework of the test design, duty rates for cross border
deliveries are presented under table 5.4. WTO average import tariff values are
applied, reflecting the mean of all effective tariffs from one specific country op-
posite all other third party countries. For the EU sales market an import duty of
10% on components and 15% on trucks is assumed. Mercosul duty rates differ-
entiate between an average rate on components of 14% and a duty rate of 35%
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on trucks (WTO 2011). All duties are paid on CIF values. The market price
for trucks at the sales markets is assumed to be 50,000 $ US, for truck engines a
price of 25,000 $ US is supposed.
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5.2 Study 1: Interactions of Mercosul LC,
duties and duty drawbacks
The main intention of the first study is to examine the interactions of duties,
duty drawbacks and Mercosul LC constraints on production decisions of a multi-
national truck manufacturer for a single period. Relevant questions are:
• How reacts the production network when taking different global aspects
into consideration while optimizing the network configuration?
• Are products and components delivered to Mercosul territory fulfilling Mer-
cosul LC?
• Is it advisable to take detailed legal frameworks into account and update
them, if necessary?
• How is the composition of total costs?
In order to examine these questions a single product environment with sufficient
high capacities for the production lines at the fully flexible production plants is
chosen. Variable costs are presumed as presented before.
Figure 5.3: Single period demand
Figure 5.3 illustrates the truck demand for one exemplary period in the markets
Brazil, Argentina and EU. In order to analyze the interactions of duties, duty
drawbacks and Mercosul LC, the study is separated into four different approaches.
First, the base case disregards duties, duty drawbacks and LC requirements. It
optimizes the classical planning situation, where no external factors are accounted
for. In a next step duties and Mercosul LC requirements are included (extension
I). Thereon, additionally duty drawbacks are respected (extension II). Finally,
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the Mercosul legal framework as intended in the future, without intra-Mercosul
duty drawbacks is examined (extension III).
5.2.1 Base case: classical planning situation
Under this approach the classical planning situation is analyzed. No external
factors are taken into account, when optimizing the problem. This results in the
production program displayed in figure 5.4. The diagram shows for every plant
its specific advised production amounts and chosen product to plant allocation
at the production lines. Colorized diagram bars for the produced quantities at
the production lines imply information on intended sales markets. This is espe-
cially useful in terms of understanding inward and outward processing schemes
proposed through the optimization solution. The routing inside the production
network can hereby, be retraced.
Figure 5.4: Network configuration for the base case
Due to disregarding LC requirements, duties and duty drawbacks the EU produc-
tion plant is fully utilized for the lower cost components, shortblock and engine
parts, serving the full demand. Labor intensive processes as the cab and truck
production take place on Mercosul territory due to lower labor costs. The truck
for the EU sales market is assembled jointly with the Brazilian cab and engine
in Brazil. At the Argentinean plant, cab, engine and truck production lines are
open, serving its home market based on otherwise higher transportation costs.
The overall cost optimal truck network supply variations are produced in Brazil
and Argentina. It is intuitive that the shortblock and the engine parts are due
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to their cost advantage produced at the EU plant.
Table 5.5: Costs base case
A detailed overview on costs for the complete production program is given in ta-
ble 5.5. All costs are displayed in million $ US. Under production costs are sum-
marized all costs occurring through the production of components and trucks.
Logistic costs account for all deliveries from plant to plant and plant to sales
markets.
The production proportion requests the biggest proportion of total costs, while
logistic costs have only an inferior position. The provided duty payments and
drawback claims are calculated ex-post relating to the chosen production pro-
gram after the optimization process and deliver therefore a benchmark for the
following extensions.
5.2.2 Extension I: Mercosul LC and duties
At this first extension, duty payments under Mercosul LC requirements are fur-
ther included when optimizing the manufacturer’s production network. Duties
have to be paid for cross border deliveries, respectively EU and Mercosul terri-
tory. If, the LC requirement of 60% for Mercosul border crossings is fulfilled, no
duties are charged.
Figure 5.5: Network configuration for extension I
Consequently, the production program is liable to changes, compare figure 5.5.
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The most obvious alteration is that it is no longer favorable to serve the EU sales
market with network supply variations assembled in Brazil as under the base
case. The EU plant produces the complete truck itself, due to otherwise high
duty payments. Nevertheless, it is still beneficial using the EU shortblock as well
as EU engine parts in engines designated for the Brazilian and Argentinean sales
markets, due to their cost advantage.
For serving the Argentinean and Brazilian sales markets with trucks, no duties
apply, since both are still served from their own plants. It is notable that each
plant produces just one specific network supply variation. This can be explained
through the sufficient high capacities available at the plants. Out of the 243
variations the most beneficial for the specific production program at each site is
chosen. This results in three variations picked, dependent on external factors and
cost structures given under this case.
Table 5.6: Costs extension I
The cost structure for the optimized production program when considering Mer-
cosul LC and duty payments is provided in table 5.6. Due to duty considerations
it is no longer profitable to produce always the cost minimal components, based
on production and transportation costs. Therefore, production costs increase
compared to the base case. Duties occur for the exportation of EU shortblocks
and EU engine parts to the Mercosul territory. The significant decrease in duty
payments, through its consideration while optimizing, results in lower overall
costs, compared to the base case. Duty drawbacks cannot be claimed under this
production network configuration.
5.2.3 Extension II: Mercosul LC, duties and duty
drawbacks
This approach considers, beneath duties and LC requirements, additionally duty
drawback possibilities for the EU and Mercosul territory. Inward and outward
processing opportunities ascend into the focus of interest. Figure 5.6 illustrates
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the optimal production program for extension II. Additionally, icons are intro-
duced providing information, if goods crossing Mercosul borders are compliant
with Mercosul LC or not.
Figure 5.6: Network configuration for extension II
At the EU production plant almost the same pattern as under extension I can be
seen, with one exception. The allowance of duty drawbacks leads to an outward
processing of EU shortblocks and EU engine parts for the EU sales market in
Brazil. This is caused due to lower assembling costs in Brazil and the opportu-
nity to claim drawbacks on paid Mercosul import duties.
The second observation is the more interesting one and not intuitive at the first
sight. The Brazilian production plant delivers one specific, LC compliant network
supply variant of the truck to the Argentinean market and vice versa. Indeed,
this is done to enable duty drawback claims on the EU shortblock and EU engine
parts used for the truck engines assembled in Brazil and Argentina and incorpo-
rated in the truck variants on-site. Since, duty drawbacks only can be demanded
for components imported for further exportation, the optimization program has
to make sure that a second border crossing takes place for the EU engine parts
and the EU shortblocks, to claim paid Mercosul import duties. This is provided
by serving the Brazilian market with trucks, incorporating the EU components
from Argentina and vice versa. Both truck variations fulfill the Mercosul LC
request, therefore, no duties apply for these deliveries.
Table 5.7: Costs extension II
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Table 5.7 provides the cost structure for extension II. Production costs decrease
slightly, compared to extension I through the consideration of inward and out-
ward processing schemes. Duties are almost fully compensated by drawbacks.
Although, this results in higher logistic costs, overall costs decrease furthermore,
compared to the base case and extension I.
5.2.4 Extension III: future legal framework
This approach considers duties, Mercosul LC and duty drawback schemes as they
are intended to in the future of the Mercosul territory. Intra-Mercosul duty draw-
backs should be abolished by CMC/DEC 20/09 until December 31st 2016. The
consequence of this modification in the Mercosul legal framework is the objective
of this extension.
Figure 5.7: Network configuration for extension III
Figure 5.7 provides the optimal production program. The EU sales market is
served with trucks the same way as under extension II, incorporating the in-
ward processed engine from Brazil. A change in contrast to intra-Mercosul duty
drawback allowance can be seen, in terms of how the Brazilian and Argentinean
sales markets are satisfied. As duty drawbacks can be claimed no longer for
intra-Mercosul deliveries the production program as chosen under extension II is
modified. The Brazilian and Argentinean plant attend under extension III their
home markets with local truck variants. However, the incorporated engines for
the Brazilian and Argentinean truck variants under intra-Mercosul duty drawback
prohibition, are assembled at the EU plant. Therefore, the Brazilian engine parts
and the EU shortblock are used. For the Brazilian engine parts duty drawbacks
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can be claimed on the paid EU import duties. Since, the engine is compliant to
Mercosul LC, no duties apply for the import to Mercosul, while the cheaper EU
shortblock can be utilized.
Table 5.8: Costs extension III
Table 5.8 provides an overview on the cost structure under the assumptions of
the future Mercosul framework. Production costs rise, while at the same time
costs for logistics and duty payments are reduced compared to extension II. Total
costs under the prohibition of intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks increase compared
to the case of intra-Mercosul duty drawback allowance.
5.2.5 Summary study 1
In this first study the production programs for three sites serving one product
to three sales markets are analyzed for a single-period. Thereto, four approaches
are analyzed.
Figure 5.8: Cost overview study 1
Figure 5.8 contrasts the cost structures of the different optimization approaches
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with each other. Even though, in the base case production costs represent the
minimum, the additional ex-post calculation of duties and duty drawbacks re-
sults in the highest total costs. Through introducing step by step extensions to
the optimization, total costs decrease with exception of extension III. Under this
approach no intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks can be claimed and a less beneficial
production program, compared to the case of intra-Mercosul drawback allowance,
needs to be realized.
It can be observed that the production network configuration differ significantly
depending on the considered global aspects while optimizing. A joint considera-
tion of duties, duty drawbacks and LC restriction is therefore advisable. Further-
more, under this study this extension derives in the lowest total costs. As long
as intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks still are applicable they should be integrated
into production planning.
Table 5.9: Cost summary study 1
Table 5.9 illustrates the percental changes in total costs, with regard to the dif-
ferent approaches. Under extension II the highest cost reduction with 5.6 %
compared to the base case can be achieved. Extension III still ends up in cost
savings compared to the base case by 4.6%. Thus, it is beneficial to integrate
duty drawback schemes into the production planning process.
It can be noticed that the joint consideration of the global aspects Mercosul LC,
duties and duty drawbacks results in a more flexible production network con-
figuration, compared to the base case or extension I. Under the base case and
extension I a closer to the market production can be observed. This changes, if
the opportunity to claim duty drawbacks is taken into account. Product flexible
plants are configured in a way to minimize obstacles to free trade and therefore
total costs.
Furthermore, can be stated that a detailed implementation of legal frameworks
and updating changes in these framework is advisable. This can be verified by
the different production network configuration for extension II and extension III,
where the two different legal frameworks for Mercosul duty drawbacks are exam-
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ined resulting in different production network configurations.
Even though, 243 network supply variations are available for producing the truck
in all four approaches, the chosen variants are limited to a maximum of three
different truck variations per extension. Yet, not in every approach are chosen
the same variations. In total 5 out of the 243 possibilities are applied. This can
be explained by the sufficient high capacities, which enable the optimization pro-
gram to choose at every time the most valuable variants considering all external
influences and cost.
Finally, it can be concluded that a joint consideration of all global aspects is ad-
visable as production network configurations adopt to these aspects in order to
minimize total costs, adjusting to this more realistic implemented environment.
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5.3 Study 2: Capacity planning
The first study revealed that Mercosul LC, duties and duty drawbacks should
be considered jointly. This second study is based on these findings and extends
the first study with regard to capacity planning. This is done to address the
global production planning problems in a more realistic context. Capacities are
no longer sufficient high but different capacity levels at the production plants can
be chosen. Thus, product flexibility is still assured. Under these changed general
conditions the second study starts by contrasting the two different duty draw-
back legal frameworks. The recommended joint consideration of Mercosul LC,
duties and duty drawbacks is extended by capacity planning decisions. Relevant
questions investigated are:
• How interact the different legal frameworks with capacity planning deci-
sions?
• Which capacities are chosen at the plants for the production lines?
• Where are components and products produced over the time horizon?
• Is there a trade-off between network flexibility and further investments into
capacity?
• How is the capacity utilization of opened production lines?
The second part of the study deals with parameter variation. The production
network configuration is examined on how cost structures and duty rates influ-
ence capacity planning decisions.
Figure 5.9: Truck demands per period
In order to execute the second study the time horizon is enlarged to five periods.
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Investments and fixed costs for different capacities of the production lines are
introduced. Due to, high investments for capacities, high capacity adjustment
costs and associated fixed costs, this topic is crucial, when designing optimal
production networks. In the following, the enlarged data framework underlying
the second study is presented. Figure 5.9 introduces the truck demands for the
five periods at the three sales markets Brazil, Argentina and EU. The demands
are based on ”global insight” forecast data for the years 2011 - 2015 (Global-
insight 2011). For the first three periods, an increase in demand at all markets
can be seen. In period four demand features a dent, due to weaker economic
developments.
Table 5.10: Production line capacities at the Argentinean plant
At each plant the same four different capacity levels are available for each produc-
tion line. Table 5.10 provides detailed information on volumes and investments
for the capacity levels at the Argentinean plant. Investments at the Brazilian
plant are thereto reduced by 20%. At the EU plant associated investments ac-
count for twice the sum of the Argentinean plant. At all production lines capacity
level 1 reflects an imaginary volume of 0 and therefore a non-utilization. Hence,
the optimization model can decide, if a certain production line is opened or not.
Capacity levels for a production line may vary over time.
A switch in capacity levels is occupied with capacity adjustment costs. Table 5.11
provides exemplary adjustment costs for cab and truck production at the Argen-
tinean plant. Adjustment costs for upgrading the capacity level at all plants are
derived through the difference of the investments between two levels. A disinvest-
ment, regardless to the amount of levels, causes always 20,000,000 $ US. Costs
for a capacity downsize need to be dispensed for employees and the dismounting
of manufacturing equipment.
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Table 5.11: Capacity adjustment costs
Periodical fixed costs for the capacity volume of a production line are set to
100 $ US per capacity unit of the active level at all plants. The net present value
of total costs is minimized over all five periods, using a discount rate of 10%.
5.3.1 Capacity planning under different legal frameworks
for Mercosul
The first study has shown that it is beneficial to include LC, duties and duty
drawbacks when designing a production network. The extension on capacity
planning is based on this approach. The objective of this subsection is to con-
trast the two legal frameworks of duty drawbacks for the Mercosul territory in
terms of capacity planning decisions. In the following, the production network
for intra-Mercosul duty drawback allowance, illustrated under figure 5.10 and
intra-Mercosul duty drawback prohibition, figure 5.11 are examined in detail.
Intra-Mercosul duty drawback allowance
At the EU plant the production lines for shortblocks and engine parts are ac-
tivated on capacity level 3. The lines produce for the EU, the Brazilian and
Argentinean sales market. Engines and trucks designated for the Brazilian sales
market are assembled at the Argentinean plant. This is done to obtain duty
drawbacks on the EU components used for the truck engines at the Argentinean
plant. Hence, drawback claims on the EU engine components outweigh the more
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Figure 5.10: Production network with intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks
expensive investments for the EU site compared to the Mercosul plants.
The engine designated for the EU sales market is processed at the Brazilian plant
using the EU shortblock and the EU engine parts. Duty drawbacks are claimed
for these EU components. Therefore, the capacity level at the Brazilian engine
production line rises with demand from level 2 to 3.
It can be concluded that the same effects as under study 1 can be observed.
Capacities inside the production network are chosen in a way to enable duty
drawback claims, when using the most favorable components from the EU plant.
This results in particular low utilization of active capacities for production lines,
at the Brazilian plant.
Nevertheless, a trade-off between investments or disclaiming duty drawbacks can
be observed. In period three, when demand peaks, at the EU plant shortblock
and engine parts production are not further extended to level 4. Instead, the
Brazilian plant produces the exceeding amount of shortblocks and engine parts.
This is done because additional investments at the EU plant outweigh possible
duty drawback claims and the cost advantage of the EU shortblock and engine
parts.
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Intra-Mercosul duty drawback prohibition
Figure 5.11: Production network without intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks
Figure 5.11 illustrates the production network under intra-Mercosul duty draw-
back prohibition. No duty drawbacks can be claimed, when crossing borders
inside the Mercosul territory. The change in the legal framework has a high im-
pact on the capacity planning decisions.
The Argentinean plant with its higher investments, in contrast to the Brazilian
plant is not used at all. Cross border deliveries of trucks between Brazil and
Argentina to obtain duty drawbacks are no more possible. The Argentinean and
Brazilian sales markets are served by the Brazilian plant with Mercosul LC com-
pliant truck variants. Capacity levels for the Brazilian production lines rise with
the demanded amounts from level 2 to 3.
The truck engines designated for the Mercosul markets are assembled at the EU
plant. It is incorporated the EU shortblock, due to its cost advantage and the
Brazilian engine parts. The engines fulfill Mercosul LC and can therefore be de-
livered without paying Mercosul import duty. This explains the chosen capacity
level 3 at the EU plant for shortblocks.
In summary, can be observed that the prohibition of intra-Mercosul duty draw-
backs concludes in a less flexible production network and a closer to the market
production in Brazil. Fewer production lines are opened, while their capacities
are used to a higher extend. Further, can be observed a trade-off for investing
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into additional capacities and cost savings through duty drawbacks. As long as
possible drawbacks outweigh investments into capacities these are realized.
Table 5.12: Cost structure comparison
Table 5.12 contrasts the cost structures of both approaches. As explained the two
production network configurations differ. In terms of total costs the difference is
not as crucial. The less flexible production network, under intra-Mercosul duty
drawback prohibition results in lower investments and fixed costs. At the same
time higher production costs have to be accepted. The loss of intra-Mercosul
duty drawback claims concludes that it is no longer beneficial to produce by all
means the cheapest network supply variations of the truck. Import duties into
the Mercosul territory cannot be retrieved; consuming possible cost advantages
of the EU components.
5.3.2 Parameter variation
The consequent parameter variation is based on the intra-Mercosul duty draw-
back allowance approach. It reflects the actual legal framework and is applicable
at least until end of 2016 (Mercosul/CMC 2009b). This approach is further re-
ferred to as base case when conducting the parameter variation. The goal of the
parameter variation is to examine, how cost parameters and different duty rates
affect:
• capacity planning decisions,
• production network flexibility and
• capacity utilization at the production lines.
The subsection is three folded. First, the impact of varying duty rates is regarded.
The second variation deals with different investment sums. Finally, the impact
of altering fixed costs on capacity decisions is examined.
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5.3.2.1 Parameter variation: duty rates
This parameter variation accommodates the dynamic environment of duty reg-
ulations. In today’s cross linked economy the number of PTAs, currently 283
(WTO 2010a), permanently increases and therefore related duty rates are under
steady change. Duty rates are not static over time, as they respond to economi-
cal developments. This subsection examines the effects of altering duty rates on
capacity planning decisions of a truck manufacturer acting on Mercosul territory.
In the following, duty rates for the EU and Mercosul territory are varied sepa-
rately. First, the impact of decreasing EU import duty rates is covered, followed
by an inquiry on altering Mercosul import duties.
Decrease of EU import duties
Under the base case an import duty rate of 10% for components and 15% for
trucks to the EU market is assumed. During the parameter variation, it is no
longer differentiated between components and products as a common duty rate
is provided.
Table 5.13: EU import duty rate alterations
Table 5.13 shows the different conducted alterations on EU import duty rates
starting with a common import duty of 10%. In the following, the changes in
terms of capacity planning decisions compared to the base case are explained.
Through analyzing the modifications, correlations between duties and capacity
planning are concluded.
The first cutback to 10% EU import duties has no effect on the production net-
work compared to the base case. A further decrease to 5% implies the first
modifications for capacity planning opposite the base case. Capacities for pro-
ducing cabs designated for the EU sales market are shifted from the EU plant to
the Brazilian plant. The cost advantage due to lower labor costs of the Brazilian
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cab are no longer compensated through high EU import duties. A further dimin-
ishment to a EU import duty rate of 3% causes a relocation of capacities for the
trucks designated for the EU sales market. The production is shifted from the
EU to the Brazilian plant, compared to the base case. This is caused by the same
reasons as for the cab. The related production network configuration is given by
figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12: Production network for 3% and 0% EU import duty rates
The EU truck production line is not active. Instead, capacities at the Brazilian
truck production line are enlarged serving additionally the EU market, opposite
the base case. A reduction of EU import tariffs to 0% results in the same capacity
decisions as under the EU import duty rate of 3%.
Figure 5.13: Network configuration for decreasing EU import duties
Figure 5.13 contrasts the production network configuration under the base case to
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the network configuration under 3% or 0% EU import duties. Links between the
plants and components or products imply the activation of the particular produc-
tion line. It can be noticed that under lower EU import duty rates the production
network is less flexible. The distorting effect of duties on the manufacturer’s pro-
duction network declines and production is relocated to the components, which
offer cost advantages.
Table 5.14: Decreasing EU import duty rates
Table 5.14 provides an overview on the cost structures for decreasing EU import
duty rates. The less flexible production network configuration results in lower
investments and therefore lower fixed costs. Fewer production lines have to be
opened in order to balance the effects of duties through duty drawback claims
on the production network. Increasing logistic costs are caused by serving the
EU sales market through the Brazilian plant, opposite the EU on-site production
under the base case. Nevertheless, total costs decline for decreasing EU import
duty rates.
Decrease of Mercosul import duties
The second alteration deals with Mercosul import duties. Under the base case a
duty rate of 14% on components and 35% for trucks was assumed. However, for
the parameter variation purpose again a common Mercosul import duty rate is
assumed and altered.
Figure 5.14: Mercosul import duty rate alteration
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Table 5.14 introduces the different conducted alterations on Mercosul import duty
rates. For the first two alterations there are no modifications concerning capacity
planning decisions, compared to the base case. Beginning with a Mercosul import
duty rate of 3% cab, engine and the truck capacities are almost completely shifted
from the Argentinean production lines to the Brazilian plant, compared to the
base case. However, for a Mercosul import duty rate of 0% all capacities located
under the base case in Argentina are now built-up at the Brazilian production
lines, compare figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15: Production network for 0% Mercosul import duty rate
This shift from Argentina to Brazil results from the decreasing import duty load
of components produced at the EU plant, imported into the Mercosul territory.
Hence, the amount of possible duty drawback claims diminishes as well. Capaci-
ties at the Argentinean plant served the production network under the base case
as basis for drawback claims. The advantage of this set-up reduces with the duty
load. A trade-off between investing in Argentinean capacity and claiming duty
drawbacks can be observed. Capacities at the Argentinean production lines are
installed as long as duty drawback claims outweigh associated investments.
Figure 5.16 contrasts the production network of the base case to the network con-
figuration under 0% Mercosul duties. Due to decreasing Mercosul import duties
and therefore duty drawbacks, the production network becomes less flexible.
High import tariffs result in production networks seeking for legal leeways to di-
lute these obstacles to free trade. Duty drawbacks offer therefore an opportunity.
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To enable duty drawback claims, adjustments inside the production network have
to be made, resulting in a higher flexibility.
Figure 5.16: Network configuration for decreasing Mercosul import duties
Table 5.15 provides an overview on the cost structures reflecting the transitions
described. Investments and fixed costs decrease with lowering Mercosul import
duties. The same can be observed for duty payments and duty drawback claims.
Table 5.15: Decreasing Mercosul import duty rates
Increase of Mercosul import duties on components
In a last step increasing duty rates on components for the Mercosul territory are
regarded. The base case introduced a duty rate of 14% on components and a
import duty rate of 35% for trucks. Tariffs on components are altered towards
the level of the already very high import duties levied for trucks.
Table 5.16: Mercosul increasing import duty rates
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Table 5.16 presents the duty rate alteration steps. Under the base case, the pro-
duction network configuration has the opportunity to fully retrieve paid Mercosul
import duties. This is achieved through building up capacities for serving trucks
to the Brazilian market at the Argentinean site and vice versa. Paid Mercosul
import duties on incorporated EU components can fully be claimed. Therefore,
capacity planning is for all alterations the same as presented under the base case.
It can be concluded that production networks, capable to retrieve import duties
are robust against high protective tariffs. In case legal frameworks allow local
manufacturers duty drawbacks, this scope can be used through a proper configu-
ration of the production network to compensate the distortion of high protective
tariffs.
5.3.2.2 Parameter variation: Investments
Capacity decisions depend on: local variable production costs, LC requirements,
duties and amongst others required investment sums. The objective of this sub-
section is to examine the impact of investments. The analysis on altering in-
vestments is two folded. First the impact of increasing investments is regarded,
followed by an examination of decreasing investments sums.
Increasing investment sums
Investments are step by step increased, compared to the base case. Table 5.17
illustrates the alteration steps.
Table 5.17: Increasing investment alterations
An increase of 10% for investments derives in a switch of capacities compared to
the base case for cab and truck production from the Argentinean to the Brazil-
ian plant. Investments at the Argentinean site no longer outweigh possible duty
drawback claims on EU components incorporated into trucks designated for the
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Mercosul sales markets.
Figure 5.17: Network configuration for alterations +50%, +100% and +200%
Altering investments by +50%, +100% and +200% leads to the same capacity
planning decisions for the production network. Figure 5.17 illustrates this net-
work configuration. Compared to the base case, in addition to the shifts observed
for +10% on investments, the EU cab production line capacities for the EU sales
market are relocated to Brazil. This is caused through the higher investment
needs for the EU cab production line, opposite the Brazilian line. Additional
investments at the EU plant exceed transport costs and duty payments for pro-
ducing the cab in Brazil and delivering it to the EU plant.
It can be stated that fewer production lines are activated with increasing invest-
ment sums. This results in a less flexible production network. Flexibility inside
production networks is used to balance external impacts as for example Mercosul
LC requirements or duty payments. However, maintaining flexibility is allocated
to investments. As investment sums rise the cost advantage generated through
network flexibility declines, resulting in fewer activated production lines. Figure
5.18 displays this development. Increasing investment sums result in a cutback
of opening production lines at the plants. This is reflected by the reduction of
product or component to plant allocations.
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Figure 5.18: Different production network configurations under increasing
investments
Table 5.18 introduces the resulting cost structures for the investment alter-
ation. Besides the increasing investment sums, caused by the alterations, can
be seen that production costs and paid duties ascend. The production network
looses incrementally its ability to outbalance external trade obstacles. Therefore,
higher production costs and duty loads are accepted to avoid further investments
into additional capacities. A trade-off between production network flexibility and
investing into capacities can be observed.
Table 5.18: Cost structures for increasing investments
91
5 Numerical Studies
Decreasing investment needs
In a second step the impact of decreasing investment sums is examined. Table
5.19 illustrates the alterations conducted.
Table 5.19: Decreasing investment alterations
Under the base case the production network configuration is already very flexi-
ble. Capacities are activated to enable duty drawback claims on EU components
incorporated into trucks for the Mercosul territory. Thus, the observed reaction
for decreasing investments on capacity planning decisions can be explained. De-
creasing investments by -50% leads to the first small shift compared to the base
case. The Brazilian truck production line is activated in addition for the first
two periods, producing trucks for the Argentinean sales market. Since, the truck
demand at the Argentinean market is not very high investments into capacities
outweigh possible duty drawback claims under the base case.
Active capacity levels between the base case and the ”- 70% decrease” alteration
differ beneath the described shift in truck production for the production lines EU
shortblock and Brazilian shortblock. Compared to the base case, capacities from
the Brazilian line are shifted to the EU shortblock production line. The complete
shortblock demand is produced at the EU plant utilizing capacity level 4. Due
to the decreasing investment sums it is beneficial to further invest into capacity
level 4 at the EU shortblock production and satisfy the complete demand.
Table 5.20 provides an overview on the cost structures for decreasing investments.
Production costs and duties paid are almost on a stagnant level caused by the
nearly identical production networks. Since, the production network configu-
ration of the base case is already capable to anticipate the distorting external
effects, decreasing investments have only a marginal impact on capacity planning
decisions.
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Table 5.20: Cost structures for decreasing investments
5.3.2.3 Parameter variation: fixed costs
Under the base case fixed costs are set to 100 $ US per active capacity unit.
Again the analysis is two folded. First, the impact of increasing fixed costs is
examined, followed by decreasing fixed costs.
Increasing fixed costs
Table 5.21 provides the alteration steps for increasing fixed costs.
Table 5.21: Increasing fixed costs alteration
The first alteration of fixed costs up to 110 $US shows a small impact on ca-
pacity planning. Capacities for the Argentinean engine parts located under the
base case in Brazil are shifted to the EU plant. This is caused through increasing
fixed costs and the otherwise low capacity utilization at the Brazilian production
line. The remaining capacities inside the production network are equivalent to
the base case.
A further increase of fixed costs to 125 $ US results in the capacity planning
displayed under figure 5.19. It is the same network configuration as the outcomes
for all further alterations suggest. Capacities for EU engine parts designated for
the Brazilian market are shifted for the first two periods from the EU plant to the
Brazilian plant, compared to the base case. Possible duty drawbacks on the EU
engine parts exceed no longer the additional investments and attached fixed costs
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Figure 5.19: Network configuration for fixed costs: 125 - 400 $ US per unit
at the EU engine part production line. Caused by this change in the production
network the relocation of capacities from the Argentinean truck production line
to the Brazilian line can be explained, opposite the base case. The decrease of
possible duty drawbacks on EU components makes a cross border delivery of
trucks from Argentina to Brazil, in order to obtain drawbacks on paid Mercosul
import duties, no longer beneficial.
Table 5.22 provides the associated cost structures for the alterations. The shift
in production from the EU to the Brazilian plant opposite the base case gener-
ates higher production and logistic costs. However, import duties decrease, since
less EU components are utilized. It can be concluded that increasing fixed costs
induce a higher utilization of activated capacities.
Table 5.22: Cost structures for increasing fixed costs
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Decreasing fixed costs
For this analysis fixed costs are altered as given by table 5.23
Table 5.23: Decreasing fixed costs alteration
The effects of decreasing fixed costs can be summarized briefly. For all alterations
the same production network configuration, as under the base case is chosen. This
can be explained by the decreasing significance of fixed costs compared to total
costs. The percentage fluctuates between 1.5% for fixed costs under the base case
and 0.2% for the alteration step to 10$ US per active capacity unit. It can be
concluded that the production network configuration chosen under the base case
is robust towards decreasing fixed costs.
5.4 Study 3: Consideration of Finame
requirements
The third study deals with the impact of the Brazilian non-tariff trade barrier
Finame on the production network of the truck manufacturer. In order to sell
his trucks on the Brazilian market the manufacturer has two possibilities. First,
serving the Brazilian market with solely Finame-compliant variations. Or second,
satisfying demands with non-compliant variations and therefore compensating his
clients. The compensation is necessary, to adjust the disadvantage for clients not
enabled to apply for the favorable development loan Finame. This payment is
introduced as a penalty payment during the optimization process and accounts
for 3,000 $ US per truck, reflecting the financial disadvantage caused through
the difference of the credit base rates. Thus, the optimization model can decide,
if all network supply variations of the truck fulfill Finame requirements, or if
associated penalties are taken into account. Relevant questions under this study
are:
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• How influences the rigid non-tariff trade barrier Finame the production
network configuration?
• Are Finame compliant network supply variants delivered to the Brazilian
market?
• In case Finame compliant variants are produced, which components are
incorporated?
• How changes the composition of total costs?
In order to examine these questions this study is organized as follows: In a first
examination the single-period set-up (compare study 1) is regarded, to obtain
unbiased information. Subsequently, the influence of Finame requirements on
the enlarged set-up for capacity planning is analyzed (compare study 2).
Single period set-up
The first study revealed that production network optimization should consider
Mercosul LC, duties and duty drawbacks. The now introduced Finame exten-
sion is therefore based on Mercosul LC, duties and duty drawback consideration
(extension II, study 1) and enlarges it by the Finame requirements in value and
weight.
Figure 5.20: Network configuration for Finame extension
Figure 5.20 provides the suggested production program. In the following, the
changes due to the introduction of Finame requirements, compared to extension
II of the first study are explained. First can be noted, the EU market is served
in the same way as under extension II, including the outward processed truck
engine from Brazil for the EU sales market. The Argentinean sales market is still
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attended by the Brazilian production site. Truck variants compliant to Mercosul
LC are used in order to claim duty drawbacks on incorporated EU shortblocks
and EU engine parts.
Indeed, a shift of production from Argentina to Brazil for the Brazilian sales mar-
ket can be seen, opposite the case of non consideration of Finame restrictions. Due
to the introduction of the Finame requirements and associated penalty payments,
it is no longer beneficial to serve the Brazilian truck demand from Argentina and
claim duty drawbacks on incorporated EU components. The Brazilian production
plant handles domestic demand through producing one specific Finame compli-
ant truck, incorporating a engine from Argentina. Thereto, the EU shortblock
and Brazilian engine parts are used to assemble a Mercosul LC compliant truck
engine.
Along with that come two advantages: first duty drawbacks for the EU short-
block incorporated into the Argentinean engine can be claimed, due to its inward
processing in Argentina. And second, the shortblock’s weight is converted from
non-originating to originating weight, through the Mecosul LC compliance of the
engine. The issuing of a Mercosul LC certificate for a good concludes that the
whole item and therefore all its antecessor components account as originating.
This is especially interesting in terms of Finame weight fulfillment. It enables
the manufacturer through proper production decisions capitalizing scopes of the
Mercosul legal framework. The remaining components are produced in Brazil
and assembled on-site to conclude Finame compliant trucks.
Table 5.24: Costs Finame extension
Table 5.24 lists the associated costs for the production program as well as the ad-
justed cost structure for extension II (Mercosul LC, duties and duty drawbacks)
presented under the first study. When determining the benefit of incorporating
Finame requirements a proper comparison can only be made, if possible penalty
payments are considered. Therefore, penalty payments for the suggested produc-
tion program under extension II are estimated and added ex-post to adjust the
cost structure.
For the Finame extension can be seen that production costs rise due to intro-
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ducing the most restrictive obstacle of free trade in Brazil. However, penalty
payments diminish to 0. It is more convenient to avoid penalty payments and
accept therefore higher production costs. Overall costs are at their lowest, when
considering in addition the Finame requirement.
Finame consideration under capacity planning
The single period set-up has shown that it is beneficial to include Finame require-
ments, when attending the Brazilian market. The chosen production network is
adjusted to avoid penalty payments.
This set-up is now extended with regard to capacity planning. Therefore, the base
case of study 2 (Mercosul LC, duties, intra-Mercosul duty drawback allowance)
is enlarged by the introduction of Finame requirements.
Figure 5.21: Production program under Finame consideration
Figure 5.21 displays the production network for the provided set-up. Capacities
for the Brazilian cab and truck production are relocated from Argentina to the
Brazilian plant opposite the base case. This is caused to avoid possible penalty
payments by serving Brazilian demand with Finame compliant trucks. Capaci-
ties at the Argentinean engine production line are activated at level 2, producing
a Mercosul LC compliant truck engine for the Brazilian market. The engine
features the EU shortblock and Brazilian engine parts. Therefore, on the EU
shortblock duty drawbacks can be claimed and its weight accounts at the end
as originating in terms of Finame requirements. It can be summarized that the
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effects observed under the single period set-up recur for capacity planning. Ca-
pacities are built up in a manner to avoid penalty payments and produce Finame
compliant trucks for the Brazilian sales market.
Table 5.25: Cost structure under Finame consideration
Table 5.25 provides an overview on the related costs. It compares the adjusted
base case from the second study, where additional penalty payments were added
ex-post, to the case of capacity planning under Finame requirements. Even
though production costs rise through the shift to the Brazilian plant, cost savings
of 3% on total costs can be achieved through the avoidance of penalty payments
by reconfiguring the production network.
Concluding can be summarized that a truck manufacturer attending the Brazilian
market in a great deal should incorporate this special non-tariff trade barrier into
his production network design process. Cost savings can be realized and capacity
planning decisions alter in order to fulfill Finame requirements. Capacities are
under Finame consideration built up closer to the market. An effect intended by
non-tariff trade barriers.
5.5 Performance analysis
Under this subsection the performance of the developed mixed integer program
(MIP) is presented. The runtime analysis was executed on an Intel Core i5 pro-
cessor with 3 GB random access memory (RAM) available. The used optimizer
software was Xpress Mosel Version 3.2.0.
Mercosul LC and Finame calculations are based on network supply variations.
Their number is concluded by multiplying all possible producing and assembling
opportunities for one product inside the production network. Network supply
variations define the dimension of the proposed optimization model. Therefore,
the quantity of network supply variations is gradually enlarged to gain insight on
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computational times.
Table 5.26: Computational times
Table 5.26 provides the results of the conducted analysis. The first set-up refers
to the data framework of the second study. Computational times are provided
for the base case. Thereupon, for the second set-up an additional truck type is
added. This results in 486 network supply variations. Finally, under the third
set-up an additional component is incorporated into the bill of materials, con-
cluding in 1,458 variations.
As the production opportunities inside the network increase, network supply vari-
ants rise as well. It can be observed that computational times are dependent on
the amount of network supply variations, which have to be considered. The in-
creasing number of network supply variations results in a significant rise of rows
and columns at the associated matrices. It can be concluded that the variants on
the one hand define the dimension of the problem and on the other hand limit
therefore the size of the solvable problem.
100
6 Conclusions
6.1 Summary
In the face of increasing globalization, a multinational corporation has to meet
numerous challenges when designing its production network. This thesis focuses
on duties, duty drawbacks and non-tariff trade barriers and their impact on ca-
pacity planning decisions and production network design. However, international
legal frameworks are endless and often differ in addition for specific industries.
A general treatment of these obstacles to trade is therefore not advisable. The
focus on this work is especially the legal framework of the Mercosul automotive
industry. It develops an optimization model for production networks with regard
to this sector.
The implemented model extends the existing literature, as it is able to evaluate
the LC on a product specific level, required by the Mercosul legal framework and
the Finame calculation method. Further, a detailed consideration of inward and
outward processing reliefs is implemented in order to generate valid results for
an optimal production network configuration.
Based on this model the numerical studies showed that a joint consideration of
Mercosul LC, duties and duty drawbacks is advisable when designing the produc-
tion network. Network configurations differ significantly depending on the global
aspects incorporated. However, through a joint consideration of all aspects the
highest cost savings could be achieved during the first study. Production net-
works are equipped with flexibility to reduce the impact of distorting influences
on free trade, through utilizing legal scopes of the underlying framework. Study 2
revealed that there is a trade-off between network flexibility and necessary invest-
ments into capacities and therefore flexibility. As long as duty drawback claims
outweigh additional investments, the flexible production network is maintained.
Further, the parameter variation revealed that duty drawback possibilities offer
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an opportunity to bypass high import tariffs. Through a suitable production
network configuration the set-up is robust against high import tariff rates.
It could be shown that an accurate implementation of legal frameworks is essen-
tial when designing production networks. The two different legal approaches for
intra-Mercosul duty drawbacks result in different production network configura-
tions and highlight therefore that an exact implementation of global aspects is
important.
Study 3 deals with the Brazilian development loan Finame. It concludes that
for a manufacturer acting on the Brazilian market, it is favorable to incorporate
this specific non-tariff trade barrier into his production network design. Major
adjustments for the production network are recommended, to comply with this
specific non-tariff trade barrier, opposite the case of non-considering. Hence, the
manufacturer’s importance with regard to the Brazilian market has to be consid-
ered very carefully.
6.2 Outlook
Future research should focus on the improvement of the developed mathematical
model. The quantity of possible network supply variations defines the dimension
of the optimization problem. However, out of the available set only a small
fraction is applied at the end. Since, the amount of network supply variations
restricts the size of the solvable problem, it should be focused on developing
methods to limit their amount up-front optimizing.
Another direction of future research is to extend the territorial focus. Due to the
increasing number of PTAs and their cross-linked cooperation, opportunities arise
with regard to production network design. Incorporating further legal frameworks
into the optimization process are in the future important topics for multinational
corporations. It enables them to cope with the increasing complexity of their
surrounding and adjust associated production networks efficiently.
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Abstract
International acting corporations have to meet various challenges in the global-
ized world. Besides the advantages, companies face increasing complexity with
regard to their environment. Tariff and non-tariff trade barriers have considerable
impact on their supply chains. Nevertheless, legal frameworks are sophisticated
and differ often in addition for specific industries.
In this thesis the focus is set on the Mercosul automotive industry. Mercosul
LC, duties, duty drawbacks and a specific Brazilian non-tariff trade barrier are
considered on a product specific level when designing production networks. To
analyze the impact of the global aspects a mathematical model is provided. Nu-
merical studies reveal insight on interactions of global aspects on the production
network of an international acting truck manufacturer.
It can be shown that the production network configuration differ significant de-
pendent on the attended global aspects. A joint consideration of Mercosul LC,
duties and duty drawbacks is therefore advisable when designing production net-
works. Production networks are equipped with flexibility to reduce the impact of
distorting influences on free trade, through utilizing legal scopes of the underlying
framework.
Keywords: production planning, Mercosul, local content, duties, duty draw-
backs, mixed-integer programming
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Zusammenfassung
International agierende Unternehmen sind mit einer Vielzahl an Herausforderun-
gen im globalen Wettbewerb konfrontiert. Neben den sich ergebenden Vorteilen
steigt jedoch auch die Komplexita¨t ihres wirtschaftlichen Umfelds. Tarifa¨re und
nicht-tarifa¨re Handelshemmnisse beeinflussen die Planung von Produktionsnetz-
werken. Entsprechende rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen sind jedoch sehr zahlreich
und unterscheiden sich oft zusa¨tzlich im Bezug auf Industriezweige.
Diese Arbeit spezialisiert sich aus diesem Grund auf die Regelungen der Auto-
mobilindustrie im Wirtschaftsraum Mercosul. Es wird ein Modell zur Produk-
tionsnetzwerkplanung entwickelt, dass neben produktspezifischen local content
Entscheidungen, Zo¨llen und Zollru¨ckzahlungen auch eine spezielle nicht-tarifa¨re
Regelung fu¨r Brasilien beru¨cksichtigt. Um die Wechselwirkungen dieser globalen
Aspekte, auf das Netzwerk zu untersuchen werden in einem letzten Teil der Ar-
beit numerische Studien durchgefu¨hrt.
Es kann gezeigt werden, dass die Konfiguration der Produktionsnetzwerke sich
in Abha¨ngigkeit von den mitberu¨cksichtigten globalen Faktoren erheblich unter-
scheidet. Aus diesem Grund ist es sinnvoll bei der Produktionsplanung Mercosul
LC, Zo¨lle und Zollru¨ckzahlungen miteinzubeziehen. Aufgrund produktionsflexi-
bler Netzwerke ko¨nnen so rechtliche Spielra¨ume ausgenutzt werden um die Be-
hinderungen des freien Warenverkehres zu minimieren.
Stichwo¨rter: Produktionsplanung, Mercosul, local content, Zo¨lle, Zollru¨ck-
zahlungen, gemischt-ganzzahlige Programmierung
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